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Public Housing:
Abandon HOPE, But Not Privatization
Stephen B. Kinnaird
Jack Kemp has a deft populist touch. As Secretary of the Department of
Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") during the Bush Administration,
Kemp took a dry economic theory, privatization, and recast it as the
centerpiece of a radical new low-income housing policy. Borrowing the
rhetoric of the "war on poverty" and "empowerment" from the Left,' Kemp
in 1990 pushed through Congress a program called "HOPE" (Homeownership
and Opportunity for People Everywhere), which included among its provisions
a proposal to sell public housing projects to the residents (HOPE-1).2 Kemp
virtually banished the term "privatization" from the housing debate. With
rhetorical dexterity he forced his opponents to aim their slings and arrows at
"homeownership," sanctum sanctorum of American politics.
1. See U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., WAGING WAR ON POVERTY: HOPE, HOMEOWNERSHIP
AND OPPORTUNITY FOR PEOPLE EVERYWHERE 1-3 (1992) [hereinafter WAGING WAR ON POVERTY]; see
also Jason DeParle, How Jack Kemp Lost the War on Poverty, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1993, § 6 (Magazine),
at 26 (discussing Kemp's rhetoric).
2. Congress enacted HOPE-I in the Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act, Pub. L. 101-
625, § 411, 104 Stat. 4079, 4148 (1990) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1437aaa to 1437aaa-8
(West Supp. 1993)). Under HOPE-I, resident management corporations or other specified groups may apply
to acquire public housing projects. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437aaa-5(1)(A-F) (Vest Supp. 1993). Applicants
must devise a homeownership program that provides for eligible families to acquire interests in at least one-
half of the units in a project. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437aaa-3(a) (West Supp. 1993). Sale prices must allow
families to complete the sale without paying more than 30% of their income. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437aaa-
3(b) (West Supp. 1993). Tenants who do not buy retain their rights as tenants and may not be evicted on
account of the homeownership program. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437aaa-3(h) (West Supp. 1993).
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For Jack Kemp, HOPE and kindred initiatives were not just a housing
policy but also a strategy of emancipation for the poor. Kemp sought a "radical
restructuring" of what he called the government "plantation."3 He even evoked
Abe Lincoln, the great Republican emancipator, in saying that the Bush
initiatives, like Lincoln's 1862 Homestead Act, would spur individual
initiative.4 Kemp believed in the transformative effects of homeownership and
freedom from government dependency. HOPE would "tear down the walls that
come between people and their self-respect ... [and] prevent people from
exercising their talents and reaching their potential." 5 Faith in markets and
private-sector competition was distinctly secondary in the HOPE agenda. Jack
Kemp was after the hearts and minds of the tenants. His was a deeply
ideological vision of privatization.6
Ideology, however, obscured the inefficiency of the form of privatization
Kemp trumpeted: selling multifamily public housing projects7 to low-income
residents. The microeconomic theory of housing tenure choice cautions us to
examine the ownership decision as a joint consumption and investment
decision.8 The owner-occupant is not only a consumer but also a producer of
housing services. The factors of risk, liquidity, transaction costs, and lack of
expertise suggest that a low-income public housing tenant, transformed into an
owner-occupant, may not be an efficient producer of housing services. This
inefficiency is compounded by the inherent costs of collective ownership that
HOPE-1 envisions, 9 which would be magnified in low-income projects.'0
Furthermore, HOPE-I's restriction on the alienability of property by resident
purchasers, a restriction designed to prevent windfall profits, undermines the
very function of private property rights in directing assets to their most-valued
3. See Departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development, and Independent
Agencies Appropriations for 1993: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on VA, HUD, and Independent Agencies
of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1992) [hereinafter 1993 House
Appropriations Hearings] (statement of Secretary Kemp); Paul Klebnikov, Showing Big Daddy the Door,
FORBES, Nov. 9, 1992, at 149; see also Jack Kemp, A Homeownership Challenge, 48 J. HOUSING 7 (1991).
4. See U.S. DEP'T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., NEW CHOICES FOR RESIDENTS: OPPORTUNITY AND
EMPOWERMENT ACT 1-2 (1992) [hereinafter NEW CHOICES FOR RESIDENTS].
5. WAGING WAR ON POVERTY, supra note 1, at ii.
6. Privatization may be justified on either ideological or pragmatic grounds, which, although often
intertwined, are analytically distinct. See E.S. SAVAS, PRIVATIZATION: THE KEY TO BETTER GOVERNMENT
4-10 (1987) (distinguishing pragmatic, ideological, commercial, and populist forces behind privatization);
Louis De Alessi, Property Rights and Privatization, in PROSPECTS FOR PRIVATIZATION 24 (Steve H. Hanke
ed., 1987) (distinguishing ideology and pragmatism). The approach to justification for privatization favors
reducing government intrusion into the lives of individuals and families; it distrusts collective action, and
emphasizes personal liberty, choice, and initiative as inherent values. The pragmatic approach has a
narrower scope; grounded in economic and public choice theory, it addresses the more limited question of
efficiency. It is ideologically neutral. A pragmatist would advocate privatization as the most efficient means
to effect either libertarian goals or redistributive, interventionist goals.
7. HOPE-1 is not limited to multifamily public housing properties, see 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437aaa-3(d)
(West Supp. 1993), but these would be the vast majority of properties in urban centers.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 115-20.
9. HOPE-I permits the tenant organization purchasing a development to choose the form of collective
ownership (co-operative, condominium, etc.). See 42 U.S.C. § 1437aaa-3(a) (Supp. HI 1991).
10. See infra text accompanying notes 146-49.
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use." In short, HOPE-1 promotes an inefficient form of ownership to
households unable to bear the inherent investment costs and risks or manage
the housing stock effectively. Though Dante may disagree, abandoning
HOPE-1 would not be an infernal turn of policy.'2
HOPE-1 has had no shortage of critics, 13 but often their criticism has
focused on the wrong issues. First, some critics charge that the cost of selling
public housing to the current residents would be exorbitant. 4 They point to
subsidies projected as high as $130,000 per unit in Jack Kemp's showpiece
Kenilworth-Parkside project in Washington, D.C. 5 Much of that cost,
however, would be incurred to maintain the units as public housing if
unsold.16 In fact, as designed, the sale of Kenilworth-Parkside could possibly
save the federal government money,17 albeit by displacing cost onto the low-
income households and thereby endangering the viability of the project.' The
high cost of Kenilworth-Parkside indicts public housing as much as resident
ownership. Second, most critics fall to differentiate resident ownership from
privatization, and unreasonably extend their critique of HOPE-1 into a defense
II. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437aaa-4(g)(l) to (2) (Supp. m11 1991).
12. DANTE ALIGHIERI, THE DIVINE COMEDY: INFERNO 47 (John D. Sinclair trans., Oxford Univ. Press
1939) (n.d.) (inscription on Gates of Hell: "ABANDON EVERY HOPE, YE THAT ENTER").
13. See, e.g., Robert Bodzin, Note, Is There Hope?, 4 HOFSTRA PROP. L.J. 239 (1992); William L.
Clay, Don't Sell Public Housing!, 47 J. HOUSING 189 (1990); Thomas J. Connelly, Jr., Resident Initiatives:
Hope or Hoax?, 48 J. HOUSING 167 (1991); Michael H. Schill, Privatizing Federal Low Income Housing
Assistance: The Case of Public Housing, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 878 (1990); Michael A. Stegman, The Limits
of Privatization, in MORE HOUSING, MORE FAIRLY: REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK
FORCE ON AFFORDABLE HOUSING 23 (1991) [hereinafter TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND]; Christopher B.
Daly, Housing Plan Too Modest for Problem, Critics Say, WASH. POST, June 23, 1992, at A19.
14. See, e.g., Report of the Task Force, in TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, supra note 13, at 16
(estimating $70,000-90,000 per unit); DeParle, supra note I (noting estimates of $100,000 per unit).
15. See Robert Guskind & Carol F Steinbach, Sales Resistance, 23 NAT'L J. 798, 800 (1991)
(reporting estimates of federal and local subsidies, including modernization, mandatory replacement of units
lost to the public housing system, and property tax and water/sewer charge abatements).
16. The per-unit cost of the Kenilworth-Parkside modernization is about par for similar work done by
the woefully incompetent District of Columbia Department of Public and Assisted Housing (DPAH). U.S.
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUBLIC HOUSING: PLANNED KENILWORTH-PARKSIDE SALE RAISES ISSUES FOR
FUTURE TRANSACTIONS 35 (1989). DPAH costs have been as high as $95,000 per unit elsewhere.
Homeownership Division, U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., Cross-Reference Talking Points 6
(unpublished document, on file with author) [hereinafter Cross-Reference Talking Points]. Not all
homeownership programs have such high modernization subsidies. A HUD survey of six sales programs
conducted by other PHA's found the average subsidy to be only $12,200 per unit. Id. at 1.
17. See LAVENTHOL & HORWATH, ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL ANALYSIS OF KENILWORTH-PARKSIDE
HOME OWNERSHIP 2 (1989) (projecting discounted net savings of $26 million over 40 years in D.C.
project). The savings calculated are predicated on a finding that the project will be financially viable under
resident ownership. Laventhol and Horwath made some heroic assumptions in finding that Kenilworth-
Parkside would be financially viable. The firm assumed that resident incomes were $8500, although
available data suggested actual incomes were closer to $6000; that incomes of resident households would
grow 10% per year for the first five years of the project, and 5.25% thereafter, that the project would
achieve 95% occupancy and 90% collectibility of rents; that administrative and operating expenses would
be reduced by 5% per year for the first five years; and that utility costs would decrease by 5% per year
for the first three years. Id. at 5-8.
18. Using more defensible assumptions (e.g., that incomes and expenses would increase at equal rates),
the GAO projected that Kenilworth-Parkside would be unable to sustain itself financially by year 13. U.S.
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 16, at 50.
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of public housing. This is true even of astute critics like Michael Schill and
Michael Stegman, who are well versed in the economic disadvantages of
public housing relative to other forms of housing assistance.' Their broad-
brush defenses, 20 focused on the advantages of well-run public housing,
overlook the grave problems concentrated in the largest and most troubled
Public Housing Authorities (PHA's).1 The evidence suggests that, in many
such PH's, operating much of existing public housing is uneconomical, and
that conditions are set to worsen.22 Schill, Stegman, and others undermine
their critiques of HOPE-1 by not considering other forms of privatization that
might stop the dissipation of scarce federal housing resources.
The advent of the Clinton Administration makes this an opportune time to
rethink privatization 23 of public housing24 in nonideological terms. The new
HUD secretary, Henry Cisneros, has distanced himself from HOPE-1, properly
wary of the burden it might place on low-income tenants.25 Yet some radical
change of course is necessary. Cisneros has taken the helm of HUD at a time
when the ship is veering towards dire financial straits, in part because of the
growing costs of the public housing program.26 Cisneros' statements to date
19. Both Schill and Stegman generally favor expanding demand assistance, in the form of vouchers
and certificates, rather than subsidizing new construction. See Schill, supra note 13, at 880, 912-13;
Stegman, supra note 13, at 127-28. Stegman appears to have retreated from his call for an annual goal of
20,000 new public housing units per year. Michael A. Stegman, The Role of Public Housing in a
Revitalized National Housing Policy, in BUILDING FOUNDATIONS: HOUSING AND FEDERAL POLICY 333,346
(Denise DiPasquale & Langley C. Keyes eds., 1990) [hereinafter BUILDING FOUNDATIONS].
20. See Schill, supra note 13, at 909-13; Stegmnan, supra note 13, at 51-56; Stegman, supra note 19,
at 362.
21. In a recent article, Michael Schill has adopted a more pessimistic line on distressed public housing.
He advocates that government not pursue a "single-minded policy of public-housing preservation" but
instead focus on policies that facilitate household mobility, reduce barriers to affordable housing, and
enforce antidiscrimination laws. Michael H. Schill, Distressed Public Housing: Where Do We Go from
Here?, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 497, 554 (1993). Schill did not reconsider privatization in his article.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 198-202.
23. Theories of, and empirical support for, privatization are well discussed in the literature and will
not be reviewed here. See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON PRIVATIZATION, PRIVATIZATION: TOWARDS
MORE EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT (1988); PROSPECTS FOR PRIVATIZATION, supra note 6; SAVAS, supra note
6; Ronald A. Cass, Privatization: Politics, Law, and Theory, 71 MARQ. L. REV. 449 (1988); Schill, supra
note 13, at 881-87.
24. Federally supported public housing is a joint federal and local enterprise. The federal government,
through HUD, finances the building, operation, and modernization of public housing. Federal law governs,
inter alia, tenant eligibility, rent structures, and operating guidelines. However, local governmental
authorities-the PHA's-own and manage the properties. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (1988 & Supp.
III 1991) (public housing statutes).
25. See Jason DeParle, H.U.D. Choice Wary of Selling Public Housing, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 1993,
at A16; Remarks of Secretary Henry Cisneros to the National Press Club Luncheon, FED. NEws SERV.,
Apr. 13, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File at *9-10. The Clinton Administration
proposed limiting funding to approved HOPE-I grants. Departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and
Urban Development and Independent Agencies Appropriations for 1994: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on VA, HUD, and Independent Agencies of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 67-
68 (1993) [hereinafter 1994 House Appropriations Hearings]. Congress rescinded $175 million earmarked
for HOPE public housing grants. Departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development,
and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act, 1994, Pub. L. 103-124, 107 Stat. 1275, 1282 (1993).
26. See Jason DeParle, Big Bills Coming Due at H.U.D., Crimping Expansion of Programs, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 8, 1993, at Al (discussing budgetary effects of rental subsidy renewals, property preservation,
Public Housing
on public housing, however, seem curiously uncritical. Although he does not
advocate new public housing construction,27 Cisneros has declared that "there
is a strong place in American public policy for traditional public housing.
' 2
The new budget accelerates spending for modernizing public housing with little
regard for the economic utility of such a policy.29 Once again, a focus on
housing stock-3 seems to drive policy towards existing public housing, while
other modes of serving low-income families fade into the shadows.
The inadequacy of HOPE-1 should not oust privatization from the debate
over the future of public housing. Many of the failings of the public housing
system-pervasive rentseeking,3" inefficiency, high cost, and inequity-are
due to its insulation from market forces. These failings have now come to a
head with increasing vacancy rates and an exorbitant modernization bill to
preserve existing stock.32 The solution lies not in trying to repair such
problems within a flawed system, but in efficiency-driven privatization. A
focus on efficiency serves two related ends: it ensures that more of every
subsidy dollar goes to the housing consumption of assisted families and that
the assets (land and housing stock) currently managed by PHXs are channeled
to their most-valued use. Privatization strategies should depend on PHA
performance and local market conditions. Such strategies may encompass sale
of assets-not to tenants, but to the highest bidder-with the funds recycled
into rental vouchers or certificates that protect tenants and allow expansion of
federal housing assistance to other families in need. Legal reform should focus
on enabling market-based decisionmaking: eliminating HOPE-1 preferences;
restructuring modernization and operating subsidies into unified market-based
payments; liberalizing demolition and disposition laws; granting statutory
authority to HUD to mandate the sale of projects to private landlords; and
relaxing voucher requirements to expedite the sale of high-cost projects.33
Low-income housing is a politically and emotionally charged issue of great
complexity. Many families struggle to afford decent housing,' and minority
foreclosed property management, and public housing modernization).
27. Cisneros favors expanding the availability of vouchers, and diverting funding to locally controlled
programs. See Rochelle L. Stanfield, Fewer Strings and Dollars, 25 NAT'L J. 523 (1993); HUD Budget
Briefing, FED. NEws SERV., Apr. 8, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File, at *11.
28. DeParle, supra note 25.
29. HUD Budget Briefing, supra note 27, at *I1-14.
30. Policy driven by the needs of the housing stock is particularly likely when the construction
industry is considered a beneficiary of low-income housing policy. See Hearing of the Housing and
Community Development Subcomm. of the House Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs Comm., FED. NEWs
SERV., Feb. 17, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File at *17-18 (statements of Secretary
Cisneros that accelerating modernization spending will create jobs and stimulate industry).
31. An economic rent is a "payment to a factor in excess of what is necessary to keep it to its present
employment." THE MIT DICrIONARY OF MODERN ECONOMICS 121 (David W. Pearce ed., 4th ed. 1992).
Public housing officials, employees, and contractors all may engage in rentseeking of various forms (e.g.,
shirking, bribery, cost overruns).
32. See infra text accompanying notes 49-72.
33. See infra text accompanying notes 204-36.
34. See infra text accompanying notes 96-101.
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households often contend not only with poverty but with discrimination in the
private market.3" This Note does not offer comprehensive answers to those
problems, nor does it address the issue of whether housing aid should be
expanded or reduced. However, the privatization strategies proposed herein,
which aim to resolve problems at the most troubled large urban housing
authorities and are tailored to minimize dislocation for affected public housing
tenants, can eliminate waste, improve benefits for assisted households, and free
funds to help currently unassisted families.
Part I of this Note outlines the current crisis in the public housing system,
especially the high vacancy rates and swelling modernization needs. It
discusses how privatization theory predicts the inefficiency that is the source
of many public housing woes. Part II explains the inadequacy of resident
ownership as a solution to the problems of public housing, particularly in the
HOPE-1 context of multifamily projects. Part III discusses the need to reshape
low-income housing policy according to the dynamics of urban housing
markets. It examines the evidence that, for many markets and projects,
conversion to demand-side programs like rental vouchers would be more
economical than maintaining existing public housing. Part IV discusses
alternative privatization strategies to improve the efficiency and equity of low-
income housing assistance, and Part V offers some conclusions.
I. THE ENDEMIC WOES OF PUBLIC HOUSING
A. Current Problems in the Mismanagement and Deterioration of the Public
Housing Stock
Public housing is far more diverse than the crime-ridden, deteriorating,
urban high-rise projects that haunt the popular imagination. The 3253 Public
Housing Authorities (PHA's) 36 differ greatly in terms of size, markets served,
and performance. While some PHA's are colossal (the New York Housing
Authority manages nearly 180,000 units),37 87% of the PHA's operate fewer
than 500 units.38 PHA's house 1.4 million households 39 in 13,200
developments 0 of highly variegated structures. Fewer than half of public
35. See infra text accompanying notes 175-77; see also Susan M. Wachter & Isaac M. Megbolugbe,
Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Homeownership, 3 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 333, 360 (1992).
36. U.S. DEP'T OF HOUS. & URBAN DE'., CAPITATED PAYMENT FORMULAS FOR PUBLIC HOUSING
115 (1992) [hereinafter CAPITATED PAYMENT FORMULAS].
37. Shawn G. Kennedy, Housing List in New York Hits Record, N.Y. TIrMES, Dec. 27, 1992, § 1, at
31.
38. CAPITATED PAYMENT FORMULAS, supra note 36, at 113.
39. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES 1992, at 356 (1992) (Table No. 564).




housing units are in high-rises,41 and federal law now bars the construction
of high-rise projects to house families with children if there are feasible
alternatives.4 2 Public housing developments are not all concentrated in areas
of urban decay,43 nor are they all dens of despair.4 Some PHA's run quite
efficiently; 500 of them require no federal operating subsidy.
45
Defenders of public housing often emphasize this alternative vision.46
Two cautions are in order, however. First, the success of some PHA's in
implementing public housing within the terms of the program does not mean
that public housing is justified vis-A-vis competing housing policies, including
privatization. Second, the alternative image of public housing should not
distract us from the reality underlying the popular image. The small clutch of
suburban garden apartments is not the problem; rather, the distressed and
wasteful projects in our central cities should command our attention. It is true
that in 1992 HUD designated only twenty-one PHA's-a fraction of 1% of the
PHA's-as "troubled;" however, these PH s alone managed 18% of the
nation's public housing units and consumed one-quarter of federal public
housing subsidies.47  The well-known scourges of urban public
housing-crime, drug trafficking, vandalism, and concentrated poverty-show
no signs of relenting in these or other PHA's,4s and the evidence now points
to a costly crisis in the mismanagement and deterioration of the stock itself.
Vacancies have been growing at an alarming rate. Nearly 8% of all public
housing units were vacant in 1991, a total of almost 104,000 units.49 That is
nearly double the number of vacancies that existed in 1986.50 In troubled
housing authorities, vacancy rates reached a staggering 14% of units in 1991.
Detroit topped the league with a vacancy rate of 44%, while East Saint Louis
41. COUNCIL OF LARGE PUB. HOUS. AUTHS. (CLPHA), PUBLIC HOUSING TODAY 16 (1988) (estimating
43% of units in high-rises in 1982, only 42% of which housed non-elderly families).
42. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(a) (1988).
43. TWenty-five percent are in suburban locations. CLPHA, supra note 41, at 5.
44. Surveys generally report high rates of tenant satisfaction. See RACHEL G. BRAT, REBUILDING A
LOW-INCOME HOUSING POLICY 63-64 (1989); Schill, supra note 13, at 898 & n.85.
45. NEIGHBORHOOD POLICY INST., NATIONAL CTR. FOR NEIGHBORHOOD ENTER., THE SILENT
SCANDAL 1 (1991) [hereinafter THE SILENT SCANDAL].
46. See, e.g., CLPHA, supra note 41, at 3; Stegman, supra note 19, at 334-37.
47. Michael deCourcy Hinds, Public Housing Ills Lead to Questions About H.U.D., N.Y. TIMEs, July
20, 1992, at AS.
48. See, e.g., Ian Fisher, Promise and Despair Share Project, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 1993, §1, at 23
(portraying crime and drug trade at Brooklyn project); Patrick T. Reardon, "We're Crying for Help":
Cabrini, tile Day After: Anguish, an Arrest, a Call for Troops: City's Public Housing Is Promise
Unfulfilled, CHI. TRIB., OcL 15, 1992, § News, at I (detailing crime at Chicago projects); Debbi Wilgoren
& Wendy Melillo, Near SE Playground, a Midday Shooting: Violence in Public Housing: Area Fuels Fear
for "Children of War," WASH. POST, Aug. 18, 1993, at D3 (describing children inured to killing).
49. 1993 House Appropriations Hearings, supra note 3, at 378. The HUD standard for vacancy rates
is 3%. See THE SILENT SCANDAL, supra note 45, at 28.
50. 1993 House Appropriations Hearings, supra note 3, at 195 (testimony of Assistant Secretary
Schiff. The rise can be dramatic within a single project. In Chicago, the vacancy rates increased from 8%
in 1984 to 45% in 1992 at the Henry Homer Homes, and from 17% to 31% during the same period at
Cabrini Green. Gangs proceeded to turn the units into crime and drug havens. See Patrick T. Reardon, CHA
Reeling from Years of Maintenance Neglect, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 2, 1992, § Chicagoland, at 1.
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and Newark weighed in at 38% and 32% respectively."1 Often, such high
vacancy rates signal irresponsible management.5 2 None of Detroit's units were
deemed uninhabitable in 1990, and a HUD official estimated in 1991 that 2500
of Detroit's 3500 vacant units could have been relet with minimal work like
painting and plastering. 3 Perversely, these high vacancies coexist with total
PHA waiting lists of nearly one million households.5 4
The stock has been not only underutilized but also neglected. Now the bill
is due. In 1992, the Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing
concluded that the total cost of fully modernizing public housing could run as
high as $29.2 billion,55 a figure which, as one observer noted, exceeds the
entire HUD budget.5 6 In 1993, HUD estimated that it would take $16.65
billion just to cover mandatory backlog modernization needs.57 The Clinton
budget, although increasing modernization spending from Bush levels, will not
make up the shortfall in the near future. It projects annual modernization
expenditures of $3.1 billion from 1994 to 1998.5 Given that $1.8 billion in
modernization needs accrue each year,59 the budget allows only $1.3 billion
per year to redress backlog needs. At that rate, assuming that extraordinary
51. 1993 House Appropriations Hearings, supra note 3, at 379.
52. The GAO, studying the issue in 1985 before the burst in new vacancies, cited mismanagement and
anticipated modernization or demolition as among the factors causing high vacancy rates. U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUBLIC HOUSING VACANCIES AND THE RELATED IMPACr OF HUD's PROPOSAL TO
REDUCE OPERATING SUBSIDIES 4-6 (1985).
53. THE SILENT SCANDAL, supra note 45, at 7; Kim Trent & Valarie Basheda, HUD Threatens To
Seize Detroit Public Housing, GANNETr NEws SERV., Dec. 19, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Papers File.
54. CLPHA, supra 40, at 4. Some PHA's have closed their lists, and the average wait for public
housing is 13 months. Stegman, supra note 19, at 333. The existence of waiting lists is not surprising even
for unattractive projects, since rental subsidies cover on average 54% of a unit's operating costs. See
CLPHA, supra 40, at 2.
The problem is not that PHA's are slow to market available units to households on the waiting list,
but that PHA's do not swiftly bring units into marketable condition. See Departments of Veterans Affairs
and Housing and Urban Development and Independent Agencies Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1993:
Hearings Before Comm. on Appropriations, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 288-89 (1992) [hereinafter 1993 Senate
Appropriations Hearings] (reporting CLPHA survey finding that only 30,000 vacancies were available for
occupancy, while 70,000 needed modernization).
55. Schill, supra note 21, at 501.
56. DeParle, supra note 26.
57. 1994 House Appropriations Hearings, supra note 25, at 84 (statement of Michael B. Janis, General
Deputy Assistant Secretary, Office of Public and Indian Housing).
Troubled PHA's are the worst offenders. In 1990, the twelve largest "troubled" PHA's, at the time
managing 17% of the stock, accounted for 30% of the mandatory modernization needs. Public Housing and
Section 8 Programs: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Housing and Community Development of the House
Comm. on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 218 (1990) [hereinafter Public
Housing and Section 8 Programs] (testimony of Dr. Ann Scbnare, HUD consultant).
Moreover, because HUD may deny modernization funds to "troubled" PHA!s deemed incapable of
putting the funds to good use, see 42 U.S.C.A. § 14371(k)(5) (West Supp. 1993), their stock is in particular
jeopardy. The rapid decline of the public housing stock in Chicago resulted in part from a HUD cutoff in
modernization funding in the mid-1980's. Chicago received only $15 million in repair funds when the need
had swelled to $1 billion. Reardon, supra note 50.
58. HUD Budget Briefing, supra note 27, at *13.
59. 1994 House Appropriations Hearings, supra note 25, at 84 (statement of Michael B. Janis, General
Deputy Assistant Secretary, Office of Public and Indian Housing).
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modernization appropriations of more than $3 billion per year can be sustained,
it would take a minimum of thirteen years just to restore public housing units
to minimally acceptable condition. Stretching out the modernization schedule
may itself add even more to the total modernization bill.60
Many factors contribute to the high costs of modernizing public
housing-notably the age of the stock61 and the scheme by which public
housing has been financed62 -but mismanagement63 is surely prominent
among them. PHA's commonly defer spending for necessary maintenance of
units. For example, PHA's spent an average of only $700 per unit per year
from 1986 to 1988, when $1,100 per unit per year was required to meet
ongoing capital needs.64 Many PHA's fail to collect rents efficiently, forgoing
a primary source of funds for maintenance of the units. In Washington, the
average uncollected rents from 1989-1991 were four times (396%) the total
monthly rents due the PHA,65 compared to a HUD standard for Tenants
Accounts Receivable (TAR) of 10%.66 The revenue forgone can be
considerable; Detroit's TAR of 33% in 1992 sacrificed almost $200,000 per
month in lost rents. 67 Poor maintenance practices have swelled, and will
likely continue to swell, the modernization needs of public housing.
Even if Congress were to increase modernization funding, it is doubtful
that HUD or the PHA's would spend it wisely or expeditiously. In January
1993, despite pressing needs, $6.2 billion in unspent appropriations sat clogged
in the modernization "pipeline. ' 68 More than 40% of the modernization funds
60. Cf. Public Housing and Section 8 Programs, supra note 57, at 78 (testimony of Dr. Ann Schnare,
ICF consultant, that under funding levels and allocation patterns existing in 1990 the backlog would grow
by 3% per year). The rate of growth caused by a stretched-out schedule under proposed 1994 funding levels
may be different.
61. One-third of public housing stock was over 25 years old in 1989, with another quarter between
15 and 25 years old. Id. at 215. Many of the largest authorities, from whose ranks the troubled PHA's
come, have considerably older stock. If we extrapolate figures from the mid-1980's, which is reasonable
given the paucity of new construction, see infra note 168, the average age of the stock of large PHA's
probably exceeds 30 years. Cf. Mark L. Matulef, This Is Public Housing, 44 J. HOUSING 175, 178 (1987)
(average age 26.7 in 1986); Reardon, supra note 50 (70% of Chicago's family units are over 30 years old).
62. See BRATr, supra note 44, at 57-58; Stegman, supra note 19, at 342-52.
63. Mismanagement refers to the mismanagement of the housing asset, and not solely to PHA
practices. HUD deserves a fair share of the blame for its misguided practices and regulations.
64. Public Housing and Section 8 Programs, supra note 57, at 218 (testimony of Dr. Ann Schnare,
ICF consultant). ICF estimated that delaying maintenance increased modernization costs by nine percent.
Id. at 78. Cf. Reardon, supra note 50 (discussing problems at Chicago housing authority).
65. 1993 Senate Appropriations Hearings, supra note 54, at 303. Over the same period, Boston's
percentage of uncollected rents stood at 71%, Chicago's at 97%, and Philadelphia's at 269%. Id.
66. See THE SILENT SCANDAL, supra note 45, at 28.
67. Center Urges Tenant Takeover of Public Housing, Cites Mismanagement of Detroit PHA, PR
NEWSWIRE, May 18, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Papers File; cf. Cynthia Dureanin, AHA Gets
a Dressing-Down; Authority Shows No Improvement, HUD Official Says, ATLANTA J. & CONST., June 25,
1991, § Local News, at CI (Atlanta loses $1.5 million per year because of high vacancies).
68. CLPHA, supra note 40, at 7-8. As CLPHA notes, much of the backlog may be due to delays at
HUD's Central Office rather than the fault of the PHA's. Still, it is fair to attribute the problem of unspent
funds to the collective management of public housing by HUD and the PHA's. See Lindsey Gruson,
Housing Aid Goes Unspent by Poor Cities, N.Y. TIMEs, June 15, 1992, at BI (detailing HUD political
skirmishing and New York PHA "bureaucratic labyrinth").
1994]
The Yale Law Journal
allocated to troubled PHA's between 1986 and 1988, which by law must be
spent within three years, remained unspent in 1992.69 Moreover, in 1990 the
HUD Inspector General found that 28 of 34 PHA's audited in a multiregion
review "engaged in varying degrees of non-compliance with contract
administration requirements" when they did get around to spending the
modernization funds.70  PHA's ignored competitive procurement rules,
squandered money on unnecessary contract amendments, and failed to provide
documentation for expense increases.7 ' Poor planning and execution have
caused wasteful delays in modernization projects.
72
B. Privatization Theory
Defenders of public housing contend that problems of mismanagement are
correctable, at least if funding levels are increased.73 However, the waste and
abuses seem endemic to public housing,74 and support the theory that
bureaucratic management of housing will lead to rentseeking and inefficiency.
Privatization theory posits that both private landlords and public housing
officials are self-interested.75 In brief, landlords pursue their self-interest by
maximizing a discounted stream of income from their housing assets. In each
short-term rental period, a landlord seeks to attract the profitable tenant while
minimizing the search and transactions costs of renting (e.g., vacancies).76
Over time, the landlord adjusts investment in the unit in response to factor
costs and market demands.77 Because the landlord's rights are transferable,
the landlord has an incentive to maximize the value of the asset with an
69. NEw CHOICES FOR RESIDENTS, supra note 4, at 4-5; see also Peoria Housing Authority Head
Fired, UPI, Aug. 31, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File (reporting $14 million in
renovation funds unspent).
70. HUD OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, MULTI-REGION AUDIT OF THE COMPREHENSIVE
IMPROVEMENT ASSISTANCE PROGRAM iii (1990), quoted in THE SILENT SCANDAL, supra note 45, at 11.
71. THE SILENT SCANDAL, supra note 45, at 11-14.
72. See, e.g., Patrick Boyle, Only Shell Is Left of Complex Plans; Troubles Plague Wilson Dwellings,
WASH. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1992, at BI (describing D.C. rehabilitation project). HUD had to freeze
rehabilitation funding for one Philadelphia housing project after $5.8 million had produced no usable
architectural drawings. See A.J. Hostetler, HUD Freezes Funding for Rehab Project, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 9,
1992, at 2D; cf. Jennie Acker, CHA Ready To Revive Scattered-Site Project, CHI. TRIB., June 5, 1992, §
Chicagoland, at 6 (citing 18-year delay); Gruson, supra note 68 (reporting drawings unfinished seven years
after construction was to have begun).
73. BRATr, supra note 44, at 82-85; CLPHA, supra note 40, at 6-10; Chester Hartman, A Universal
Solution to the Minority Housing Problem, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1557, 1564 (1993).
74. Nine of the "troubled" PHA's have been on the list since it was started in 1979. See Hinds, supra
note 47.
75. See De Alessi, supra note 6, at 25.
76. See JEROME ROTHENBERG ET AL., THE MAZE OF URBAN HOUSING MARKETS: THEORY, EVIDENCE,
AND POLICY 131-33 (1991). Vacancies are a search cost because the landlord withholds the unit from the
market while waiting to get a more profitable tenant.
77. Id. at 165-66.
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infinite time horizon. The landlord's pursuit of self-interest is consonant with
consumer needs and efficient investment in the housing stock.78
No such market forces trouble the public housing official in the pursuit of
her self-interest. In order to increase (or at least maintain) the PHA's share of
the budgetary pie and thereby improve her own career prospects, the
entrepreneurial official has an incentive to stimulate a perceived need for her
own programs, no matter what market conditions warrant.79 Moreover, the
public housing official does not have to be directly responsive to tenant needs
because (a) the public housing tenant cannot transfer his subsidy to another
supplier and (b) PHA revenues depend largely on budgetary allocations, and
only partly on tenant rents. PHA officials thus focus on satisfying requirements
set by HUD and Congress, which only imperfectly reflect tenant needs and
local market supply conditions, including factor costs. Because none of the
officials are owners, self-interested officials will concentrate their energies on
"salary, perquisites, rank, prestige, and opportunities for promotion."80 To
make these assertions is not to discount altruistic or public-regarding
behavior' nor direct special cynicism towards public employees.8 " Rather,
the point is that to the extent self-interest channels behavior, it is less likely to
have socially beneficial effects in public housing than in the private market.
The most egregious rentseeking by public housing officials is outright
corruption. The HUD Inspector General reported eleven instances of corruption
involving bid-rigging, bribery, embezzlement, or ethics violations, at least nine
of which resulted in suspension or criminal sentences for PHA officials
between 1988 and 1990.83 Political corruption drove the Philadelphia PHA
into receivership in 1992.' A similar fate has befallen five other PHA's since
1989.85 Fraud and theft have loomed large in recent scandals at PHA's in
Washington, D.C. and Boston.
8 6
78. De Alessi, supra note 6, at 27.
79. Id.
80. James T. Bennett & Thomas J. DiLorenzo, The Role of Tax-Funded Politics, in PROSPECTS FOR
PRIVATIZATION, supra note 6, at 15, 17.
81. See Schill, supra note 13, at 886.
82. Walter F. Baber, Privatizing Public Management: The Grace Commission and Its Critics, in
PROSPECTS FOR PRIVATIZATION, supra note 6, at 153, 161 (discussing studies finding similar motivations
among private and public employees).
83. THE SILENT SCANDAL, supra note 45, at 24.
84. See Dale Russakoff, U.S. Seizes Philadelphia Public Housing Authority; HUD Acts After Political
Corruption Charge, WASH. POST, May 21, 1992, at A3.
85. See Hinds, supra note 47.
86. See Peter S. Cannellos, BHA: $22m Lost to Waste, Fraud at Sites; Funds Could Have Fixed 400
Units, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 21, 1992, at 1; Rene Sanchez, D.C. Housing Agency Target of Fraud Probe;
HUD Says It's Checking Millions in Contracts, WASH. POST, May 29, 1992, at Al; see also Former
Housing Aide Given 57 Months, WASH. TIMES, May 29, 1991, at A2 (misappropriation of $1.7 million in
Passaic, NJ.); Elijah Gosier, Housing Authority Misused Funds, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 30, 1992,
at 3B ($3.6 million unaccounted for in Saint Petersburg, Fla.); Head of North Bergen Housing Authority
Charged with Bribery, UPI, Jan. 4, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File (North Bergen, N.J.);
Lawyer for Woods Expected Supreme Court To Reject Appeal, UPI, Apr. 2, 1991, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, UPI File (Pittsburgh bribery scandal).
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Corruption is an agency cost that also plagues private enterprise, including
the private housing market. So conceived, a higher incidence of corruption and
rentseeking in the public housing system reflects a greater failure of
government "owners" to monitor their agents. Differences in property rights
may explain this failure. Because private landlords can transfer their rights in
the housing asset and fully recover its value, they have incentives to maximize
the asset's profitability over the long term. Competition impels them to use the
least-cost combination of inputs in producing a given level of housing output,
including monitoring other resource owners (contractors and employees) with
whom they form contractual relations to produce that output.87 By contrast,
taxpayers do not own transferable property rights in the assets and cannot
recover any surplus that sale of the assets would generate. Because costs are
spread over a broad base, taxpayers have comparatively little incentive to
monitor their agents in Congress in the spending of tax dollars on the public
housing stock.88  The multilevel structure of the public housing
system-Congress, HUD (national and regional), PHA's-makes monitoring
difficult and further exacerbates the agency problem.
If this theory is correct, one would expect PHA's to incur substantially
higher costs than private housing suppliers. The empirical evidence is
unambiguous: a 1982 study done for HUD found that it cost 40% more per-
unit to build conventional public housing than unsubsidized FHA housing.89
Most of the cost differential owed to inefficiency in production, and not to
inherent cost differences in the types of projects built.90
PHA's also fare poorly in controlling operating costs. Another 1982 study
found that PHA per-unit operating costs were 61% higher than costs in the
private sector in 1980.91 In every region, the largest PHA's had the largest
87. See generally De Alessi, supra note 6, at 28-31.
88. Id. at 31; see also Schill, supra note 13, at 883-84.
89. U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., THE COSTS OF HUD MULTIFAMILY HOUSING PROGRAMS
S-17 (1982) [hereinafter HUD MULTIFAMILY HOUSING] (analyzing projects developed between 1975 and
1979). The differential was higher (56%) on a per-square-foot basis. Id. at S-7 (comparing development
costs per square foot of $49.80 for conventional public housing to $31.87 for unsubsidized FHA housing).
Earlier studies had estimated public housing to be generally 25-50% more expensive than private housing.
John C. Weicher, The Voucher/Production Debate, in BUILDING FOUNDATIONS, supra note 19, at 286.
90. "Programmatic" costs, which "reflect the relative efficiency of housing production under the
different program variants," HUD MULTIFAMILY HOUSING, supra note 89, at S-4, accounted for 31 of the
40 percentage point differential between conventional public housing and unsubsidized FHA housing. See
id. at S-17, S-23. PHA's were especially inefficient in managing "hard costs" of development, which are
defined as the costs of land, construction, architectural and engineering fees, and certain off-site costs. Id.
at S-4 n.1. The hard costs of public housing were 55% higher than their unsubsidized FHA equivalents.
Id. at S-22. The structure of federal subsidies may have contributed to this inefficiency. Because historically
90% of capital costs were subsidized by the federal government, and operating costs were not subsidized,
PHA's inefficiently substituted capital expenditures for current expenditures. See RICHARD F. MUTH,
PUBLIC HOUSING: AN ECONOMIC EVALUATION 16-20 (1973).
91. U.S. DEP'T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., ALTERNATIVE OPERATING SUBSIDY SYSTEMS FOR THE
PUBLIC HOUSING PROGRAM 374 (1982). The 61% differential must be regarded as a rough approximation
because data were not directly comparable. See id. at 381. However, PHAs were significantly less efficient
in all three categories of costs (administrative, utility, and maintenance). Id. at 378.
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cost differentials. 92 Excessive costs are particularly acute at "troubled" PHA's.
From 1989 to 1991, all but one of the twenty-three PHA's designated as
"troubled" in January 1992 had excess administrative staff by HUD standards,
and all but three had excess maintenance staff.93 Generally, these high costs
buy precious little service. The notorious District of Columbia Department of
Public and Assisted Housing (DPAH) has consistently failed to fix the heating
or roofs at its projects despite having 168 excess maintenance workers;
94
Philadelphia's 627 maintenance workers had roused themselves to repair only
25 vacant units per year prior to HUD's seizure of the PHA in 1992.9'
To recap, vacancy rates are high and rising at PHA's. Systemic neglect has
caused the housing stock to deteriorate, creating mammoth modernization
needs. Current spending practices seem unlikely to fix these problems. Large,
"troubled" PHA's are the worst offenders. Although one cannot tar all PHA's
with their sins, many of their problems-high costs, vacancy rates, and
modernization needs-beset the public housing system as a whole.
Privatization theory predicts these results, given the greater vulnerability of
government enterprise to rentseeking and poor monitoring of performance.
Inefficient public housing creates inequity, not just waste. Low-income
housing is not an entitlement program. In 1992, almost 4.7 million households
received federal rental assistance.96 However, HUD estimates that another 13
million qualify for aid under federal guidelines, but did not receive assistance
because of lack of funding. Of these, 5.1 million unassisted families are
considered "worst-case needs" because they have very low income, live in
"severely substandard" conditions, and spend more than 50% of their income
on rent and utilities.97 Housing assistance makes a big difference in family
92. Id. at 372. A 1992 HUD study confirmed the inefficiency of the largest PHA's by comparing their
costs to their smaller brethren. Extra-large PHA's (managing 6500 units or more) garnered $5127 per
household in modernization and operating subsidies from the federal government, versus levels of $2784
per household in medium PHA's (500-1249 units) and $2475 in small PHA's (under 500 units). CAPITATED
PAYMENT FORMULAS, supra note 36, at 26. If subsidies are adjusted for local cost factors and reallocated
among PHA's on a per-occupant basis, extra-large PHA's would receive 21% less funding. Id. at 50.
93. 1993 Senate Appropriations Hearings, supra note 54, at 301-02. Six PHA's had more than double
the recommended level of administrative staff. Id. at 301.
94. Courtland Milloy, Another Winter Without Heat, WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 1993, at B 1. Sixty-one of
86 units inspected in a federal audit of D.C. public housing failed to meet HUD standards. Ruben
Castaneda, HUD Calls D.C. Housing Mismanaged; Auditors Question Millions in Spending, WASH. POST,
Oct. 6, 1992, at Al.
95. Hinds, supra note 47. The failure to control costs goes hand-in-hand with bad financial
management at many PHA's. See Peter S. Cannellos, $1.2m BHA Deficit Discovered; New Chief HUD
Talk of Crisis, BOSTON GLOBE, at 21; Castaneda, supra note 94 (reporting HUD audit tagged DC DPAH
with improperly spending $1.3 million and failing to account for another $6.1 million from 1988 to 1992);
see also HUD Seizes Chester Housing Authority, UPI, Nov. 7, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
UPI File (reporting $2 million in losses over 3 years as cause for HUD's seizure of Chester, Pa. PHA).
96. HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, OVERVIEW OF ENTITLEMENT PROGRAMS: 1992 GREEN
BOOK, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 1679 (1992) [hereinafter 1992 GREEN BOOK]. Another 826,000 low- or
moderate-income homeowners received assistance in that year. Id.
97. See DeParle, supra note 26; see also CLPHA, supra note 40, at 4 (reporting HUD estimate that
only 29% of eligible families are effectively assisted). The sharp rise in estimates of "worst case" needs
since the mid-1980's derives in part from the broadening of the definition of "household" to include
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budgets. Whereas the average household below the poverty level spends 50%
of its gross income on housing costs,98 assisted households spend only 30-
36% of their adjusted incomes99 on housing costs." Inequity in housing
assistance has worsened in recent years, as growth in the number of poor
households has outstripped growth in the number of households receiving
housing assistance.'"' Wasteful programs only bar the door to more families
in need.
The inefficiency of public housing cannot be cured while retaining the
present system, especially given the current funding climate and HUD's
notorious mismanagement."0 Jack Kemp had a vision for change: in
HOPE-i, he advocated converting the public housing stock from government
management to private ownership by selling projects to the residents. This
vision, while appealing, is flawed because it involves a form of privatization
that is economically untenable. Only after understanding the economic
weakness of the Kemp program can we go on to discuss more promising forms
of privatization that would better serve current public housing tenants as well
as other families not yet given housing assistance.
II. SELLING PUBLIC HOUSING TO THE RESIDENTS: A FLAWED IDEA
Jack Kemp pressed for HOPE-1 legislation despite the disappointing
results of past federal programs to sell public housing to low-income families.
As of 1991, PHA's had sold only 60% of the 13,875 units available under
Turnkey III, a 1968 program in which PHA-managed units were sold to
tenants over time under lease-purchase agreements.'0 3 The Public Housing
unrelated individuals. See Departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development and
Independent Agencies Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1992: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on
Appropriations, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 499 (1991) [hereinafter 1992 Senate Appropriations Hearings].
98. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE & U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., AMERICAN HOUSING SURVEY
FOR THE UNITED STATES IN 1991, at 64 (1993) [hereinafter AMERICAN HOUSING SURVEY]. Households in
central cities spend on average 55% of their gross income on housing costs. Id. at 389. But see Robert C.
Ellickson, The Untenable Case for an Unconditional Right to Shelter, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 28-30
(1992) (arguing that inaccurate survey data overstates affordability problem).
99. The adjustments include exclusions for earned income, child care, medical care, and dependents,
which may be significant for some households. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437a(b)(5) (Supp. III 1991).
100. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ASSISTED HOUSING: RENT BURDENS IN PUBLIC HOUSING AND
SECTION 8 HOUSING PROGRAMS 10-12 (1990). By statute, assisted households are supposed to pay the
higher of 30% of adjusted monthly income or 10% of total income, see 42 U.S.C. § 1437a(a)(1)(A)-(B)
(1988 & Supp. 1111991) (general provisions); 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o)(2) (1988) (vouchers), but there is some
variance depending on how utility allowances are handled. Id.
101. See William C. Apgar, Jr., The Nation's Housing: A Review of Past Trends and Future Prospects
for Housing in America, in BUILDING FOUNDATIONS, supra note 19, at 25, 55 (finding growth of 2.8
million households below poverty level from 1974-85 and fewer than 1.4 million net new households below
the poverty level receiving subsidy).
102. On HUD's mismanagement, see generally Michael A. Wolf, HUD and Housing in the 1990's:
Crisis in Affordability and Accountability, 18 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 545 (1991). See also Jason DeParle,
Reports Warning of H.U.D. Problems, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1993, at A21.




Homeownership Demonstration (PHHD), launched in 1984, met with similar
difficulties. Of the 1315 units approved for sale, only 420 (32%) had been sold
by mid-1991, with another 280 projected for sale by year's end. 1 4 Poor
program execution contributed to these lackluster results.'05 The deeper
problem is that homeownership is uneconomical for many very low-income
households. HOPE-1 and other programs for transferring ownership of units
to the residents of public housing does not secure the efficiency gains that
justify privatization as a policy choice.
The economic argument for privatization of public housing is that it will
lead to more efficient transactions between consumers and suppliers. Both the
demand and supply sides of a transaction can be privatized in a government-
subsidized transaction. Privatization of demand means giving the consumer
choice over which unit to occupy, perhaps by a voucher.06 This is especially
appropriate for private goods like housing because they are individually and
not jointly consumed, allow exclusive enjoyment, are produced in a
competitive market that provides a high degree of choice, and largely
internalize the costs and benefits of the transaction. 7 Privatizing demand-
side activity recognizes widespread differences in individual preferences'0°
and gives incentives for individuals to shop to maximize their utility.
Privatizing housing supply recognizes that individuals specialize as housing
suppliers because of comparative advantage and produce goods at a wealth-
maximizing combination of price, quality, and quantity of output. Market
competition eliminates economic profits above the normal rate'09 and ensures
that the most efficient producer supplies the service that the consumer wants
within the standards set by the housing assistance program.
Any assessment of the efficiency of a housing privatization program must
take into account the fact that housing supply consists of an intertemporal flow
of services from a unit. Housing supply can be roughly conceptualized as
comprising three different value-added functions, which are not always
performed by the same producer. The first value-added function is the original
production of the durable asset. Because it is durable, the unit can provide a
stream of services over time."' Some of those services are structural, such
104. 1992 Senate Appropriations Hearings, supra note 97, at 521-22.
105. For example, poor PHA performance in designing and managing the program also hindered sales.
See Stegman, supra note 13, at 76-80.
106. The economics of vouchers are discussed infra at text accompanying notes 170-71, 198-202.
107. See SAVAS, supra note 6, at 35-48, 96, 98 (discussing privatization generally). Of course, costs
and benefits are not entirely internalized in low-income housing, which is why society chooses to grant
housing subsidies. The efficiency-based rationale for government intervention is that there is a "direct
consumption externality" in low-income housing (i.e., members of society derive utility from the improved
housing consumption of low-income households). GEORGE FALLIS, HOUSING ECONOMICS 138 (1985).
108. See De Alessi, supra note 6, at 25.
109. Id. at 27-29 (discussing property rights and markets generally).
110. Cf Allen C. Goodman, An Econometric Model of Housing: Price, Permanent Income, Tenure
Choice, and Housing Demand, 23 J. URB. ECON. 327, 330 (1988) (asset value related to discounted value
of stream of services expected from unit).
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as the shelter or aesthetic pleasure a unit provides, and others derive from the
location, such as a good school district or convenient access to parks,
shopping, or downtown."l' The second value-added function is the supply of
current services that are produced throughout the period of consumption. These
include security, common-area upkeep, and ordinary maintenance and repair.
A landlord provides these incidental services to a renter, and an owner
provides them to herself. The third value-added function is asset rehabilitation
to enhance the productivity of unit-based services."2 When the owner of a
housing unit also occupies that unit, the owner is both a consumer of housing
services and a producer, performing the second and third value-added functions
(either directly or by contracting with another party).
HOPE-1 is an inefficient form of privatization because it vests low-income
households with value-added functions (second and third above) for which they
are often not well suited. Specifically, many public housing residents lack
expertise in managing inputs efficiently as compared to other producers (both
landlords and other homeowners). Because the risk/return profile and illiquidity
of housing as an asset make homeownership uneconomical for such
households, the government would need to provide significant subsidies to
make the program work. The commendable fairness provisions in HOPE-i,
which restrict resale to prevent windfall profits,' l3 limit one of the traditional
benefits of privatization, namely that the free alienability of property directs
assets to their most valued use. Moreover, the collective ownership involved
in HOPE-1 is inherently inefficient. In short, the disincentives for most low-
income public housing residents to own their units are so high that subsidies
would have to be enormous. The case for subsidizing risky housing investment
by a subset of low-income households--especially while housing consumption
needs of other poor families remain unmet-is far from compelling." 4
Ordinarily, in choosing to own rather than rent, the owner-occupant
simultaneously chooses optimal housing consumption and an optimal portfolio
investment."l5 As her own landlord, effectively pricing to herself the services
demanded, the owner maximizes her net revenue (properly discounted) so as
to satisfy her demand for services and earn a competitive return on her
111. See RICHARD F. MUTH & ALLEN C. GOODMAN, THE ECONOMICS OF HOUSING MARKETS 1, 2,
6 (1989).
112. See EXPERIMENTING WITH HOUSING ALLOWANCES: THE FINAL REPORT OF THE HOUSING
ASSISTANCE SUPPLY EXPERIMENT 340 (Ira Lowry ed., 1983) [hereinafter HOUSING SUPPLY EXPERIMENT].
113. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437aaa-4(g) (Supp. III 1991).
114. Economists have questioned the wisdom of policies encouraging housing investment generally.
See, e.g., Edwin S. Mills, Social Returns to Housing and Other Fixed Capital, 17 J. AM. REAL EST. &
URB. ECON. ASS'N 197, 207 (1989) (finding real returns to housing capital in the United States from 1929-
86 to be only 37% of returns to non-housing fixed capital and more variable). But see Patric H.
Hendershott, Comments on Social Returns to Housing and Other Fixed Capital, 17 J. AM. REAL EST. &
UR. ECON. ASS'N 212, 213 (1989) (finding lower degree of overinvestment).
115. See RAYMOND J. STRUYK, URBAN HOMEOWNERSHIP 27-28 (1976); J.V. Henderson & Y.M.
Ioannides, A Model of Housing Tenure Choice, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 98, 102 (1983).
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investment." 6 The demand for housing services turns on many factors, such
as permanent income," 7 family characteristics, point in the life cycle, unit
price of housing services, and the price of other goods."' The demand for
housing investment is a function of housing services demand, wealth, expected
length of tenure, the expected rate of return on housing investment, the
expected rate of return on other forms of investment, the risk of the housing
investment, and the degree of risk aversion.1 9 Excluding tax effects, the
demand function for owner-occupancy would incorporate all those factors, as
well as the household's preference for owning versus renting.' 20
Economic theory predicts lower rates of homeownership for the lowest
income households,' 2' and empirical data indicates a positive correlation
between homeownership and income levels for all family types.'22 On an
aggregate level, households below the poverty line in central cities are
disproportionately likely to be renters. 123 Homeownership has also been
found to be strongly linked to employment, which affects both permanent
income and mortgage availability.' 24 Public housing residents, who have low
reported incomes and low rates of employment, 125 generally cannot be
homeowners without a special government subsidy.
116. STRUYK, supra note 115, at 32. Because of the high transaction costs associated with purchasing
a house, the owner maximizes an intertemporal utility function. See FALLIS, supra note 107, at 37.
117. Permanent income is the "average income that the individual or household expects to receive over
a period of time while retaining his wealth intact." THE MIT DICTIONARY OF MODERN ECONOMICS, supra
note 31, at 328.
118. STRUYK, supra note 115, at 28.
119. See id. at 28-29; Yuming Fu, A Model of Housing Tenure Choice: Comment, 81 AM. ECON. REV.
381, 383 (1991) (discussing risk); John P. Shelton, The Cost of Renting Versus Owning a Home, 44 LAND
ECON. 59, 66 (1968) (discussing effects of expected length of tenure).
120. See STRUYK, supra note 115, at 35. For most of the very low-income households targeted by
HOPE-I, tax breaks would not be an issue.
121. Struyk predicts a nonlinear relationship between income and homeownership (s-shaped function),
with very low rates of ownership for the lowest levels of income. Id. at 35-37.
122. See STRUYK, supra note 115, at 64; Dora J. Moore, Forecasting the Probability of
Homeownership: A Cross-Sectional Regression Analysis, 2 J. HOUSING RES. 125, 141-42 (1991); Wachter
& Megbolugbe, supra note 35, at 340-41 ("Virtually all studies of tenure choice have found income a
statistically significant determinant of the probability of ownership."). This is not to imply that
homeownership is scarce among low-income groups. As discussed above, homeownership decisions are
complex and based on many variables, such as the life cycle of a household, its preference for owning, and
(for taxpaying households) tax subsidies. See, e.g., MAHLON R. STRASZHEIM, AN ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS
OF THE URBAN HOUSING MARKET 106-07 (1975) (showing different income elasticities of demand for
different household types). Rates of homeownership have been significant even among the lowest income
quintile. See Thomas M. Holloway, The Role of Homeownership and Home Price Appreciation in the
Accumulation and Distribution of Household Sector Wealth, Bus. ECON., Apr. 1991, at 38, 40-41.
123. See AMERICAN HOUSING SURVEY, supra note 98, at 38, 376 (finding 78% of households below
the poverty level in central cities rent, versus 51% of all households in central cities, and 36% of all
households nationally).
124. See Axel B6rsch-Supan & Henry 0. Pollakowski, Estimating Housing Consumption Adjustments
from Panel Data, 27 J. URB. ECON. 131, 143 (1990). A recent Canadian study contends that current wealth
is a stronger determinant of tenure choice than permanent income for young households. Lawrence D.
Jones, Current Wealth and Tenure Choice, 17 J. AM. REAL EST. & URB. ECON. ASS'N 17 (1989).
125. The average reported household income of a public housing tenant is $7394. CLPHA, supra note
40, at 3 (reporting HUD data). Fifty-eight percent of non-elderly households have no wage eamer. Stegman,
supra note 19, at 335.
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One reason for lower rates of homeownership among very low-income
households is that they are not well suited to undertake the high risks of
housing investment.126 For them, homeownership is a poor instrument for
diversification, because the value of their homes is large relative to the
household's total wealth. 27 Housing investment demand increases with
wealth if the coefficient of absolute risk aversion is decreasing. 2 ' This
means that poorer households are likely to be more risk-averse than wealthier
households because the consequences of loss are severe; thus, poorer
households are more likely to invest in assets less risky than a home.
Risks are associated with both the future market value and the costs of
owning and maintaining the asset. The market value of the asset may evaporate
with physical destruction, rapid neighborhood change, or other alterations in
demand conditions. 129 Housing costs are volatile and have risen steeply in
recent years. William Apgar estimates that the total annual cost in 1988 dollars
of owning and operating a home (adjusting for equity buildup and the
opportunity cost of down payment) rose from $4777 in 1967 to $8015 in
1988.130 When it comes time to sell the home, the household may not reap
the expected rate of return that justified the investment in the first place. The
relatively low demand experienced in Turnkey III and the PHHD,'3 ' and
fears about affordability voiced by assisted households who are prospective
owners, 32 may suggest some disinclination to incur risk.
Liquidity constraints also deter homeownership by low-income
households. 33 Illiquidity may make it "costly or impossible for potential
owner-occupants to obtain the necessary capital"'" for initial purchase or
improvements over time. Because lenders consider the housing asset to be
inadequate security for mortgage debt, owner-occupants will face high interest
rates or even complete denial of credit. 35 Homeowners facing severe
liquidity constraints are unlikely to be efficient producers of housing services.
They may not be able to absorb the volatility in housing costs or make supply
126. Economists agree that housing is a risky asset, but differ as to the magnitude of the risk. Compare
Mills, supra note 114, at 207 with Hendershott, supra note 114, at 216.
127. See Henry Hansmann, Condominium and Cooperative Housing: Transactional Efficiency Tax
Subsidies, and Tenure Choice, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 25, 37 (1991).
128. Fu, supra note 119, at 383.
129. See STRUYK, supra note 115, at 30.
130. Apgar, supra note 101, at 27. Homeownership costs also grew dramatically as a percentage of
median income from 1965 to 1983. See William C. Apgar, Jr., Recent Trends in Housing Quality and
Affordability: A Reassessment, in HOUSING ISSUES FOR THE 1990's 37, 56 (Sara Rosenberry & Chester
Hartman eds., 1989).
131. See supra text accompanying notes 103-05.
132. See, e.g., Sebastian Rotella, Pioneering Tenant-Ownership Effort Loses Steam, L.A. TmEs, Aug.
25, 1991, at B3.
133. See Peter Linneman & Susan Wachter, The Impacts of Borrowing Constraints on Homeownership,
17 J. AM. REAL EST. & URB. ECON. ASS'N 389, 398-400 (1989).
134. See Hansmann, supra note 127, at 37.
135. See id. The liquidity constraints that poor households face may reflect credit market imperfections
(e.g., discrimination, redlining) as well as the inherent risk in their undertaking this investment.
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adjustments in response to shifts in market conditions or their own demand for
services. 36 Homeowners who defer maintenance risk rapid wasting of their
assets.'37 A landlord who can easily obtain credit may be able to supply the
housing demand of low-income households more efficiently. 3
Given their liquidity constraints, low-income households often struggle
with the financial burdens of homeownership. While long-term data from the
PHHD is not yet available, results from the first eighteen months indicate that
10-15% of buyers experienced some difficulty meeting their housing costs.
About 3 1% of buyers interviewed indicated that payments were straining their
budgets, and 10% admitted to being in arrears by almost one month. 39
Michael Stegman, one of HUD's PHHD evaluators, predicts that failure rates
eventually will approach 10%.t40
Finally, unassisted low-income households cannot generally afford the high
transaction costs associated with home ownership. The administrative costs of
changing title and negotiating debt financing are significant, often approaching
10% of house value.' 4' Excluding tax effects, transaction costs are such a
large factor that homeownership may become economical only if the household
stays put for five years. 42 The high risks and costs of homeownership will
deter many low-income households from choosing this form of investment, as
has been evident in past federal programs to sell public housing units.
HOPE-I requires an inflated subsidy to offset the high costs of converting
low-income tenants to homeownership. 143 Low-income families require the
base subsidy of consumption, which is the same if the PHA owns the unit, and
an additional subsidy to insulate them from the high costs of riskbearing,
illiquidity, and transactions associated with homeownership.' 44 Whereas the
136. Because housing is an illiquid asset and low-income households are particularly vulnerable to
unexpected income loss or expenses in other areas (e.g., health care), it is not rational for them to allocate
their savings to housing. HOPE-I's resale restrictions make such an allocation particularly ill-advised by
prohibiting the low-income homeowner from selling her unit in the first six years for more than her costs
(contributions and improvements) plus inflation. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437aaa-4(g)(2) (Supp. III 1991).
137. See HOUSING SUPPLY EXPERIMENT, supra note 112, at 340.
138. Liquidity problems have been evident in past homeownership programs. High interest rates
prevented some potential Turnkey III buyers from getting mortgages. See Stegman, supra note 13, at 46.
In the PHHD, only five of the 13 PHA's that sold homes were able to muster private financing for the
sales. Private financing was secured for only 25% of the single-family units. Id. at 64-65.
139. Id. at 71.
140. Id. at 72. Some HUD officials disagree vehemently with Stegman's conclusions. They point out
that, excluding two Denver cooperatives, PHHD's failure rates accord with FHA experienee. Interview with
Gary Van Buskirk, Director, Homeownership Programs, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development, in Washington, D.C. (Mar. 18, 1993).
141. MUTH & GOODMAN, supra note 111, at 6; see also Hansmann, supra note 127, at 38.
142. See Shelton, supra note 119, at 66.
143. To the extent that public housing residents have persistently low incomes and are not temporarily
poor, HOPE-l subsidies would have to be deeper than a homeownership program aimed at a broad cross-
section of low-income households. See Michael A. Stegman et al., Designing Better Homeownership
Assistance Programs Using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID): An Exploratory Analysis, 2 J.
HOUSING RES. 39, 72 (1991).
144. Such subsidies were evident in the sale of the Kenilworth-Parkside project: a) heavy
modernization spending needed to insulate residents from near-term maintenance and rehabilitation costs,
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PHHD rigorously screened prospective buyers, under HOPE-1 even the poorest
households are able to buy their units for less than 30% of their reported
income, thereby magnifying the risks and costs to be offset by subsidies. t45
The costs of riskbearing, illiquidity, and transactions are inherent in any
form of ownership. But there is another significant source of costs that inheres
in the form of multifamily ownership encouraged by HOPE-i: the costs of
collective decisionmaking.
The private-market analogues to HOPE-1 collective ownership are
condominiums and cooperatives. 46 In a recent article, Professor Henry
Hansmann has suggested that, without large tax subsidies, cooperatives would
generally compete poorly with apartment rentals. 47  Collective
decisionmaking inflates the costs of cooperatives relative to landlord-operated
developments. It also entails high transaction costs and leads to inefficient
outcomes because owners' interests are heterogeneous and decisions are made
by voting. 148 HOPE-1 will probably exacerbate the problem of collective
governance. Since current residents can choose not to buy but have the right
to retain their unit as renters, 49 not all HOPE-1 residents will be owners.
Non-owning residents will rent from the cooperative, but the relationship will
not be one of market contracting at equilibrium rents. The owners may have
incentives to act strategically against the interests of the renters, leading to
inefficient outcomes in which renters receive lower benefits than if the PHA
managed the units.
Given the difficulties faced by low-income households in coping with
homeownership costs and the special problems of converting multifamily
projects to resident ownership, privatization to tenants may make economic
sense under only very confined conditions: namely, selling single family homes
to tenants at the high end of the tenant income distribution. Because of what
economists term the "fundamental rental externality,"' 50 sales of such units
b) transition subsidies designed to build operating reserves, c) elimination of financing and transfer costs,
and d) sale of property for nominal value. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 16, at 17-18.
HOPE-i also involves costly planning and implementation grants to help inexperienced and inexpert
residents in the transition to ownership. Planning grants have averaged $130,000 and implementation grants
$1.3 million per resident management council. Interview with Cheryl Fox, Staff Aide, Senate Housing and
Community Development Subcommittee, in Washington, D.C. (Mar. 16, 1993).
145. HOPE-I provides only weak mechanisms to ensure that financially unqualified families will be
screened out. The homeownership proposal must identify a method for screening families, see 42 U.S.C.
§ 1437aaa-3(c)(1) (Supp. 111 1991), and HUD's selection criteria must examine the extent to which families
will be able to afford homeownership. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437aaa-2(e)(3) (Supp. I 1991).
146. For simplicity, I will refer only to cooperatives for the rest of the discussion, although the
argument applies to any form of collective ownership.
147. Hansmann, supra note 127, at 68.
148. The preferences of the median voter may not be those of the mean voter. Voting also invites
certain stakeholders to act strategically to dominate collective decisionmaking to the detriment of others.
By contrast, under rental market contracting, a landlord has an incentive to select policies that are efficient
so as to maximize aggregate rents. Id. at 34.
149. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437aaa-3(h) (Supp. III 1991).
150. The externality is that tenants do not face the social marginal costs of their utilization of the unit.
A landlord can collect from the tenant only part of the costs of the utilization of the unit above the basic
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to residents may be economically advantageous, I1 provided that the residents
have the financial resources to cope with the costs of homeownership. It is not
surprising that, prior to HOPE-1, the vast majority of successful sales of public
housing units fit this profile of economic viability.
15 2
In sum, there are significant costs associated with transforming low-income
tenants into homeowners, particularly when they live in multifamily units. If
privatization to tenants makes sense, it is in the limited case of selling high-
cost single-family units to tenants with relatively high incomes."53 Making
other forms of privatization to tenants viable would require significant federal
subsidies. There seems to be a stronger case for, and greater social consensus
on, subsidizing low-income housing consumption instead of housing
investment. Jack Kemp made the ideological claim that homeownership would
have transformative effects on families now dependent on government
contract rent. Although landlords may be able to recover for obvious damage to the units, they cannot
recover the marginal costs of increased breakdowns and wear and tear on the unit. Because of this
externality, contract rents must be sufficiently higher than expected maintenance costs. Henderson &
loannides, supra note 115, at 99-102. The costs of moral hazard are more likely to be significant in rented
single-family homes, which explains a U.S. owner-occupancy rate of 85% in that dwelling type. Such costs
are less of a factor for multifamily apartment buildings, because unit maintenance by the tenant is minor
relative to investments in the exterior shell and utility systems. See Hansmann, supra note 127, at 33.
151. There is some evidence that purchasers of single-family units maintain their homes better than
public housing authorities. See RAY FORREST & ALAN MURIE, MOVING THE HOUSING MARKET 74-80, 103
(1990) (United Kingdom experience); Stegman, supra note 13, at 46 (Turnkey HI experience). Single-family
ownership ensures that the "landlord" is on-site, which is more efficient and eliminates the costs of a PHA
managing scattered-site units. See Frank W. Porell, One Man's Ceiling Is Another Man's Floor:
Landlord/Manager Residency & Housing Conditions, 61 LAND ECON. 106, 116 (1985) (30% fewer
maintenance deficiencies if landlord/manager resident); Stegman, supra note 12, at 59-60 (noting PHA
view, disputed by HUD, that single-family homes are expensive to manage on a per-unit basis).
152. A 1989 survey covering 1231 public housing units indicated that most were single-family
detached or semi-detached homes, and that the average income of the purchaser was $15,138. Public
Housing and Section 8 Programs Hearing, supra note 57, at 498 (1989 NAHRO survey). Most units sold
in the PHHD were single-family units, and the buyers had household incomes averaging $16,673, with
91.3% of the households having at least one wage earner. See Stegman, supra note 13, at 68.
153. Some commentators have argued that family stability and a predictable income of $17,000-
$20,000 are necessary to support homeownership. See Peter W. Salsich, Jr., A Decent Home for Every
American: Can the 1949 Goal Be Met?, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1619, 1643 (1993).
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assistance. Because that claim remains unproven, 154 HOPE-1 does not at this
time justify the risks or diversion of funds it entails.
Ill. RETHINKING PRIVATIZATION: RESPONDING TO MARKET INCENTIVES
AND MAXIMIZING ASSET VALUES
Abandoning HOPE-1 should not lead us to forswear privatization. The
current crisis in the public housing system remains most acute in the larger,
poorly managed PHA's. Not only has money been misspent, but deferred
modernization and high vacancy rates will likely accelerate deterioration of the
housing stock. Meanwhile, as funds are diverted to prop up public housing,
many eligible families go unserved. If we are concerned about helping more
families within current budgetary limits, we must focus on the efficiency of
housing assistance programs. A focus on efficiency leads to two related goals:
to ensure that more of every dollar of subsidy goes to housing consumption of
assisted families, and to ensure that assets (land and housing stock) currently
managed by PHA's are channeled to their most valued use. The latter would
entail selling assets to the highest bidder and recycling the funds into rental
vouchers that protect tenant interests and allow expansion of federal housing
assistance. This privatization strategy is likely to succeed because it integrates
housing assistance more fully with local housing markets. Consumers receive
wider choice and suppliers react to market incentives.
A market-based housing policy is not a matter of ideological preference.
It simply recognizes that, however a housing initiative is structured, the effects
of that initiative are in large measure market-determined. Housing is a special
kind of good,' 55 which generates an extremely complex and segmented
154. There is no conclusive empirical data on the effects of homeownership on very low-income
families. Some multifamily ownership cooperatives have failed. In 1986, the U.S. government foreclosed
on the Longwood Cooperative, after years of fraud and mismanagement by its board, despite having poured
in $10 million in subsidies. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ASSISTED HOUSING: OVERVIEW OF THIE
PROBLEMS AT THE LONGOOD COOPERATIVE IN CLEVELAND, OHIO 2-3 (1988). Failures of collective
governance contributed to the 27% turnover rate that afflicted one Denver PHHD cooperative and the 20%
delinquency rate that plagued another. See Stegman, supra note 13, at 60-61, 72-73. In contexts not directly
comparable to HOPE-I, homeownership has not prompted significant behavioral change. See Ray Forrest
& Alan Murie, Transformation Through Tenure? The Early Purchasers of Council Houses, 20 J. Soc.
POL'Y 1, 11 (1991) (finding no long-term effects on occupational position or economic performance of
U.K. households buying council homes; however, such tenants are older, more established, and relatively
better off than comparable public housing tenants in the U.S.); Ronald Krumm & Austin Kelly, Effects of
Homeownership on Household Savings, 26 J. UR. ECON. 281, 293 (1989) (finding homeownership does
not induce significantly higher overall savings for owner-occupied housing at mean values).
Moreover, to the extent we do want to encourage homeownership among lower income families,
subsidies should be directed to households on the margin that would be better able to sustain its costs and
risks than the average public housing tenant. A recent study found HOPE-type subsidies, in part because
they are available to even very low-income households, to be more expensive than better targeted
homeownership programs. Michael A. Stegman et al., Using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID)
To Evaluate the Affordability of Alternative Mortgage Instruments and Homeownership Assistance
Programs, 2 J. HOUSING RES. 161, 187-88, 191-93 (1991).
155. See ROTHENBERG Er AL., supra note 76, at 2-3 (discussing distinctive traits of spatial immobility,
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market structure, particularly in urban areas. The economists Rothenberg,
Galster, Butler, and Pitkin characterize the urban housing market structure as
a "collection of distinct yet interrelated submarkets" that adjust rapidly to
changes in demand, costs, or government policy. 56 Whether or not policies
will have their desired results depends on the conditions--construction and
operating costs, vacancy rates, demand and supply elasticities, existing
government policies like rent control-that exist in the affected segments of
local markets. 57 These economists caution that government must avoid
policies that will cause counterproductive adjustments in a local market,
especially those which affect unsubsidized low-income households.'58
Although they concede that there is "no unambiguously 'best' housing
policy in all circumstances,"' 59 Rothenberg and his co-authors find that
demand-side policies-for example, rental vouchers that allow households to
shop in the private market-generally prove superior to other types of policies
on both efficiency and equity grounds:
Demand-side approaches are fundamentally different from either
supply-side or market-regulatory approaches because they do not
engender conflicting [endogenous] adjustments across submarkets
which counteract policy intents.
Demand-side approaches directly attack the root of the problem
in most markets-the inability of some households to afford decent-
quality housing at current rents for such. When rent supplements are
provided to these households, the market responds so as to supply
more housing to the quality level at which these augmented demands
are concentrated .... [This benefits] policy participants by lowering
market valuations in the target submarkets [without adversely
affecting nonparticipants]. 60
Empirical data support the theory that demand-side assistance is the most
effective approach. Supply is nearly perfectly elastic over the medium term
(about five years) in most submarkets. 6 ' This means that suppliers will fully
meet excess demand generated in rental submarkets 62 By contrast, there is
no evidence that past public housing initiatives have "had a net positive impact
on the stock in any rental submarket, and even less evidence that they reduced
the occupancy of lower-quality rental submarkets."'163  Integrating
durability, multidimensional heterogeneity, physical modifiability, etc.).
156. Id. at 48.
157. Id. at 353-54.
158. Id. at 355.
159. Id. at 354.
160. Id. at 355.
161. Id. at 518.
162. Id.
163. Id. (footnote omitted). Economists who have studied the issue have reached similar conclusions
about the inefficacy of public housing and other forms of subsidized production. See Michael P. Murray,
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privatization of public housing assets with a voucher program for tenants will
likely lead to greater efficiency without adverse market effects."6
The last fifteen years have seen a shift into more efficient demand-side
programs like Section 8 existing-housing certificates and vouchers. Some
commentators165 cite the dramatic reductions in budgetary authorization for
housing aid in recent years 6 6 as evidence that the government is abandoning
low-income housing. In fact there has been a steady increase in the number of
families receiving rental assistance over the last fifteen years-from nearly 2.1
million in 1977 to almost 4.7 million families in 1992.167 Even though the
Reagan and Bush administrations brought new public housing production to
a virtual standstill, 161 lost production was offset by an increase in household-
based assistance for rental housing from 599,000 households in 1981 to
1,166,000 households in 1992.169
Demand-side programs like vouchers not only have more beneficial market
effects, but also are more cost-effective for government. In 1992, HUT
Subsidized and Unsubsidized Housing Starts: 1961-77, 65 REv. ECON. & STAT. 590, 590 (1983); Craig
Swan, Housing Subsidies and Housing Starts, I AM. REAL ESTATE & URB. ECON. ASS'N J. 119, 134
(1973) (finding changes in nonsubsidized starts to offset 85% of changes in subsidized starts); John C.
Weicher & Thomas G. Thibodeau, Filtering and Housing Markets, 23 J. URB. ECON. 21, 38 (1988) (finding
little evidence that subsidized production for poor households reduces incidence of substandard housing).
But see Donald F. Vitaliano, Public Housing and Slums: Cure or Cause?, 20 URB. STUD. 173, 182 (1983).
164. The Supply Experiment carried out over 10 years in the 1970's found a number of positive
benefits to the voucher approach (here used to describe demand-side allowances generally). Vouchers did
not result in rent inflation, even in test markets where they were made available as an entitlement. See
HOUSING SUPPLY EXPERIMENT, supra note 112, at 26; Weicher, supra note 89, at 278. Predictably,
vouchers did not stimulate new housing production, see id. at 280, but they did stimulate widespread, low-
cost repairs by landlords and tenants to meet program quality standards. See HOUSING SUPPLY EXPERIMENT,
supra note 112, at 26, 195-96. Thus, vouchers are effective because the technology of housing services
production is very flexible, and landlords can vary factor inputs to expand output (e.g., flow of services)
to meet demand. See id. at 340-41. Contrast this form of responsiveness with the poor maintenance records
of many troubled PHA's.
165. See, e.g., BRATr, supra note 44, at 4; Mary K. Nenno, Reagan's '88 Budget: Dismantling HUD,
44 J. HOUSING 103, 108 (1987); Stegman, supra note 13, at 25-26.
166. In 1992 dollars, net budget authority appropriated for housing aid was more than $60 billion
dollars in both 1977 and 1978. From 1987-90, annual net budget authority was in the $10-12 billion range,
increasing to more than $20 billion (estimated) in 1992. 1992 GREEN BOOK, supra note 96, at 1680. The
factors behind the decrease in budget authority are the reduction in the net new commitments to households
for assistance; the shift towards cheaper forms of housing assistance; reductions in the term of new
commitments; and changes in public housing financing. Il at 1679. The budget authority for adding a
public housing unit must cover the capital costs of new construction; it is necessarily higher than the budget
authority needed for vouchers, which cover only a portion of a household's rent during a specified time
period. Lower levels of budget authority do not mean that commitments to households have been reduced,
but only that the required expenditures have been spread over time.
167. Id. at 1679. It should be noted that the assisted household is obligated to pay the same percentage
of its income for rent under alternative programs, compare 42 U.S.C. § 1437a(a)(1)(A) to (B) (1988 &
Supp. 111 1991) (public housing and Section 8 certificates) with 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o)(2) (1988) (vouchers),
and ceteris paribus will be indifferent to the form of subsidy.
168. Annual public housing completions reached 29,576 in 1981 (based on projects authorized in the
1970's), but fell precipitously in the late 1980's. CLPHA, supra note 40, at 5 (using HUD data). During
fiscal year 1991, only 2378 new public housing units were begun and 2753 were completed. U.S. DEP'T
OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., ANNUAL REPORT 199i, at 13 (1992). HUD predicts a net reduction in public
housing units for the first time in fiscal year 1994. CLPHA, supra note 40, at 4.
169. 1992 GREEN BOOK, supra note 96, at 1679.
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estimated that, over a twenty-year period, building a new public housing unit
is 36% more expensive than providing the same subsidy via a rental voucher
or certificate.170 Voucher programs also deliver far superior value to low-
income households. In the Housing Supply Experiment, 85% of program
dollars in housing were found to serve low-income recipients, versus just 34%
of public housing dollars. Builders and administrators captured 60% of the
spending on public housing.
71
Despite abundant evidence of the economic superiority of demand-side
assistance, some commentators have voiced concern that reliance on such
programs would ill serve minorities, who face especially acute housing
problems. 72  De facto racial segregation persists in many housing
markets, 173  with detrimental second-order effects on minority welfare. 74
Persistent discrimination in the private sector is to blame, at least in part.
175
Minorities struggle to afford housing, paying on average a higher percentage
of their reported income on housing than whites. 76 Because minorities
traditionally have had less success than whites in securing housing in the
private market with vouchers, critics contend that shifting to voucher programs
may worsen the housing status of low-income minority households.
177
Vouchers are no panacea for racial inequity in housing markets,77 but
the fear that voucher programs would have adverse effects on minorities does
not seem well-founded. First, racial discrimination may not fully explain
differences in voucher success rates. 179 Second, the relevant comparison is
170. 1993 House Appropriations Hearings, supra note 3, at 213-16 (HUD analysis). Prior studies
confirm that vouchers are less expensive than new public housing construction. See, e.g., CONGRESSIONAL
BUDGET OFFICE, CURRENT HOUSING PROBLEMS AND POSSIBLE FEDERAL RESPONSES 50 (1988) (estimating
discounted cost of a new public housing unit for the elderly to be 16-50% more expensive than the cost
of Section 8 certificate over a twenty-year period, depending on the discount rate); PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION ON PRIVATIZATION, supra note 23, at I 1 (estimating 20-year cost of public housing unit 150%
that of vouchers or Section-8 certificates).
171. See HOUSING SUPPLY EXPERIMENT, supra note 112, at 348-49. Housing subsidies function
primarily as income supplements; only 8% of the program dollar goes to increased housing consumption
in public housing, 10% in Section 8 existing housing, and 15% in housing allowances. Id.
172. See, e.g., CLPHA, supra note 41, at 10; Hartman, supra note 73, at 1565.
173. See John C. Boger, Toward Ending Racial Segregation: A Fair Share Proposal for the Next
Reconstruction, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1573, 1575-76 (1993)
174. Id.; see also STRASZHEIM, supra note 122, at 6.
175. See Boger, supra note 173, at 1577-78. But see Thomas Schelling, A Process of Residential
Segregation: Neighborhood 2ipping, in ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY LAW 307, 310 (Bruce A.
Ackerman ed., 1975) (theorizing that segregation would occur even in the absence of discriminatory
practices by suppliers if whites and blacks have different preferences for racial mix of neighborhood).
176. See John C. Boger, Race and the American City: The Kerner Commission in Retrospect-An
Introduction, 71 N.C. L. REv. 1289, 1335-36 (1993); Hartman, supra note 73, at 1560.
177. CLPHA, supra note 41, at 8 (72% failure rate for minorities versus 52% for non-minorities).
178. A 1975 econometric study of the San Francisco Bay Area market suggests that raising household
incomes, which is effectively what vouchers do, is unlikely to reduce disparities in black and white housing
consumption so long as blacks do not penetrate predominantly white submarkets. See STRASZHEIM, supra
note 122, at 138-41.
179. Undoubtedly, minorities will encounter discrimination in shopping for housing with vouchers.
See Comments by Ann B. Schnare, in DO HOUSING ALLOWANCES VORK? 141, 143 (Katharine L. Bradbury
& Anthony Downs eds., 1979) [hereinafter HOUSING ALLOWANCES] (reporting that 21% of black
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the effect on minority groups of vouchers relative to other forms of housing
assistance. The possible inequities in voucher programs must be contrasted not
with the ideal world, but with the shortcomings of public housing. Although
public housing avoids the problem of racial discrimination in the private
market, it too has been plagued by discriminatory practices and has contributed
to the segregation of urban minorities.
180
Properly administered, voucher programs can serve the cause of racial
integration and provide targeted help to low-income minority families. Arising
out of a Supreme Court case in which racially discriminatory practices were
found in the management of public housing,' the Gautreaux program in
Chicago uses vouchers to move minority households out of racially segregated
public housing. 182 More than 4500 households have participated in the
program since 1976, and more than half of the households have moved to the
suburbs.183 Not only has the program given families the chance to upgrade
their housing, but it has had significant positive second-order effects on the
educational performance and employment status of children whose families
moved to less segregated suburbs1t 4 The Clinton Administration has recently
announced a "Moving to Opportunity" initiative modeled after Gautreaux to
move 3000 poor families from inner-city projects to the suburbs.8 ' Because
they do not tie families to distressed urban projects, vouchers have great
potential to help needy minority families.
The key to improving voucher performance seems to be technical
assistance to eligible families. Without such assistance, families might be
unable to find housing that meets quality standards within the rent constraints
of a program, or might suffer discrimination in the private market. Many
households in Pittsburgh experiment encountered discrimination). However, racial discrimination may not
be important in determining the ultimate success of a household in leasing an apartment with vouchers. The
most important factor appears to be the quality of a household's current housing. Voucher programs set
minimum quality standards for the physical condition (heating, plumbing, fire safety, etc.) of the apartment.
See 24 C.F.R. § 887.251 (1992). If a household lives in an apartment that meets program standards, it can
get the rental subsidy without moving. Other households would have to move in order to receive the
subsidy, which is a significant deterrent to participating in the voucher program. In EHAP, households
whose housing quality was furthest from program standards were least likely to participate. Mahlon R.
Straszheim, Participation, in HOUSING ALLOWANCES, supra, at 113, 129. Because of poverty or
discrimination, minorities are more likely to live in substandard housing than nonminorities; similar reasons
may explain in part their lower success rates in leasing apartments. See Garland E. Allen et al., The
Experimental Housing Allowance Program, in HOUSING ALLOWANCES, supra, at 1, 25. Economist John
Weicher interprets the evidence as indicating that minorities per se may have the same success rates as
whites, given the same initial housing condition and location. Weicher, supra note 89, at 276-77.
180. See Boger, supra note 176, at 1337.
181. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976).
182. James E. Rosenbaum et al., Can the Kerner Commission's Housing Strategy Improve
Employment, Education, and Social Integration for Low-Income Blacks?, 71 N.C. L. REv. 1519, 1522
(1993).
183. Id.
184. Id. at 1553. The availability of role models, better labor markets, and superior schools appear to
be the chief reasons for improved achievement. See generally id. at 1530-39.
185. See Guy Gugliotta, Shallow Pockets and Big Needs Prod "Small" Thinking at HUD, WASH.
POST, July 13, 1993, at A6 (describing "Moving to Opportunity" initiative).
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minority families are reluctant to transplant themselves into alien and distant
white neighborhoods." 6 One of the reasons that the Gautreaux program
works relatively well is that the managing agency actively "finds landlords
willing to participate in the program, notifies families as apartments become
available, and counsels them about the advantages and disadvantages of the
move; counselors accompany them to visit the units and communities."'8 7
Because poor administrative practices at PHA's appear generally to reduce
voucher success rates, 188 which average an uncomfortably low 65% for rental
vouchers and 61% for Section 8 certificates,' 89 expanded technical assistance
must be a central ingredient of future voucher initiatives.
The advisability of a voucher program, like any housing policy, depends
on specific market conditions. For example, it may not work effectively in
markets experiencing shortages caused by a rent-control regime.190 New
York, which has rent control, has a low success rate in voucher lease-ups. 191
Interestingly, though, while much concern has been expressed about the
decrease in the number of low-rent units in recent years, 192 demand-side
programs have been found to work effectively in tight markets. The quality of
existing stock and constraints on producers to alter supply appear to bear more
on the success of voucher programs than do vacancy rates per se.1 93
Moreover, as John Weicher points out, today's tight markets are neither
yesterday's nor tomorrow's, and there is no evidence that the government
redresses supply shortfalls more quickly than does the private sector.194 In
any event, past failures do not mean that voucher programs should be
abandoned: certain markets may need altered rent levels and quality standards,
186. Rosenbaum, supra note 182, at 1553.
187. Id. at 1522.
188. See 1993 House Appropriations Hearings, supra note 3, at 100 (testimony of Joseph Schiff,
Assistant Secretary for Public and Indian Housing).
189. 1992 Senate Appropriations Hearings, supra note 97, at 523.
190. See ROTHENBERG Er AL., supra note 76, at 354. Because owners of rent-controlled dwellings
cannot raise rents, they respond to upsurges in demand by downgrading their units to improve their rate
of return. Id. at 337. Stimulating demand by housing vouchers would not achieve the policy goal of
improving housing conditions for lower income families in markets with rent control.
191. See Public Housing and Section 8 Programs, supra note 57, at 170 (CLPHA data of 65% failure
rate in New York City).
192. William Apgar identified a decrease of 1.6 million units renting for under $300 between 1974
and 1985. Apgar, supra note 101, at 44. Recent data suggest more slack in urban markets. The 1991
Housing Survey indicates an overall rental vacancy rate of 7.8% in central cities, with higher rates
persisting in lower cost units (units with monthly costs-rent, utilities, incidentals-below the median cost
level of $392). See AMERICAN HOUSING SURVEY, supra note 98, at 17.
193. Weicher, supra note 89, at 278-79; see also RAYMOND J. STRUYK Er AL., HOUSING POLICIEs FOR
THE URBAN POOR 36 (1978).
194. Weicher, supra note 89, at 279-80.
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increased technical assistance, 195  relocation subsidies,' 96  and more
enforcement of antidiscrimination laws to enhance program effectiveness.9 7
In most markets, economic considerations clearly favor vouchers over
construction of new public housing. However, in select markets and projects,
vouchers may be even more economical than already-built public housing. A
1992 HUD analysis found, that on a unit-to-unit comparison, the average
twenty-year cost of maintaining the public housing inventory is less than that
of converting tenant subsidies to vouchers. 198 However, HUD often pays
subsidies for vacant public housing units.' 99 Applying the current vacancy
rate of 8%, the cost of maintaining existing public housing on a per-occupied-
unit basis exceeds the cost of assisting a family with a voucher.200 Moreover,
looking at average costs is misleading. Whereas well-run public housing,
usually found in small- to medium-PHA's, may be cost-effective to maintain,
preserving the worst parts of the public housing inventory may be far more
expensive than voucher conversion. 20 ' A 1990 study found that
modernization needs swell the ongoing costs of 19% of public housing units
beyond that of Section 8 certificates. 0 2 Current public housing stock should
not be preserved at any cost; the relative economics of preservation and
voucher conversion, which can only be assessed at the project level, should
drive policy.
HUD's first priority in an era of tight budgets should be to ensure that its
methods of subsidization are economically efficient, provided that any change
in policy protects affected families from dislocation and avoids racially
disparate impacts. An efficiency-driven policy to privatize public housing must
be gradual and targeted to the worst of the PHA's. There are a number of
reasons for HUD to proceed deliberately, though steadfastly, in privatization.
First, HUD does not have the resources to implement a broad privatization
program effectively.203 Second, privatization must be carefully tailored to the
local market and the assets of the PHA. The PHA must assess the market
value and cost structures of each of its different developments, the feasibility
of voucher conversion, and the sustainability of units that will remain as public
housing. A PHA may find that it is maintaining both economically viable and
195. See Anthony Downs & Katharine L. Bradbury, Conference Discussion, in HOUSING
ALLOWANCES, supra note 179, at 375, 397-99.
196. Cf. Straszheim, supra note 179, at 127 (finding significant search and relocation costs to limit
participation in EHAP program).
197. Cf. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f(t) (West Supp. 1993) (antidiscrimination provision limited to owners
under contract to receive payments).




202. See Public Housing and Section 8 Programs, supra note 57, at 222-23 (testimony of Dr. Ann
Schnare, ICF modernization consultant). If funding were limited to mandatory modernization needs, 10%
of units would still be more costly than vouchers. Id.
203. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 235-36.
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unviable developments, in which case it should direct its privatization efforts
primarily toward the latter. Third, HUD will need to build a record of success
to overcome the political resistance that any privatization policy will encounter.
Rather than privatize public housing to the tenants, HUD should adopt a
privatization policy that focuses on eliminating waste from the public housing
system and making more funds available for unserved families.
IV. PRIVATIZATION STRATEGIES
Three privatization strategies should be pursued:2°4 (1) "simulated
privatization," in the form of conversion of federal subsidies to a payment
system based on fair-market rents; (2) statutory reform permitting asset-
maximizing disposition of current public housing properties; and (3) direct
privatization of economically unviable projects to the highest bidder. The first
two strategies should be implemented broadly: they give PHA's the incentives
and flexibility to make economically rational decisions in response to market
forces and tenant needs. The third strategy should be focused on the largest,
urban "troubled" housing authorities. To the extent that any of these strategies
require currently occupied units to be emptied, they should protect displaced
tenants by converting their subsidies to vouchers.
A. "Simulated Privatization": Shifting to Market-Based Subsidies for PHA's
The current subsidy and modernization funding systems, which are not
responsive to market forces, contribute to mismanagement of the public
housing stock. The current system for allocating operating subsidies to public
housing is the Performance Funding System (PFS).2 5 Under the PFS,
subsidies are based on Allowable Expense Levels (AEL's), modeled on the
expenditure patterns of well-performing PH's. °6 The PFS has few fans; its
critics complain that its payments are inadequate and that it creates perverse
incentives for PHA's.2 °7 Critics contend that the original design of the
subsidies underestimated legitimate costs of PHA's, particularly large PHA's
and high-cost PHA's in low-cost regions. 08 Moreover, PFS inflation
adjustments have not kept pace with actual cost increases, 20 9 and PFS has not
accounted for new costs that PHA's have had to bear, such as the costs of
increased security in crime-ridden areas and implementation of new HUD
204. These strategies could be pursued independently, but would likely be most effective if conducted
simultaneously.
205. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437g (West Supp. 1993).
206. See 24 C.F.R. § 990.105 (1992).
207. See CAPITATED PAYMENT FORMULAs, supra note 36, at 5; Stegman, supra note 19, at 349.
208. See Stegman, supra note 19, at 349.
209. See CLPHA, supra note 40, at 6; CAPITATED PAYMENT FORMULAS, supra note 36, at 6; Stegman,
supra note 19, at 350.
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mandates.21 The PFS also imposes no market-based cost constraints on
PHA's. It grants PHA's full subsidies for vacancy rates below 3% and partial
subsidies for vacancy rates above that threshold. The PFS offers a PHA weak
incentives to fill vacancies expeditiously."'
Current modernization funding also is insensitive to market pressures.
Under the current system, 212 HUD awards modernization funds based on a
formula that accounts for the backlog and accrued needs of a PHA relative to
the needs of other PHA's.213 Thus, funding is primarily determined by the
needs of the stock, rather than by the comparative economics of maintaining
current public housing versus serving families by alternative means. Worse yet,
in 1992, Congress revised the Major Reconstruction of Obsolete Projects
("MROP") program to permit HUD to divert as much as 20% of funds
appropriated for new public housing development to restore "obsolete" projects
even if modernization exceeds the cost of new development. 14 Bad projects
draw good money.
Private housing suppliers, of course, do not spend money based on the
needs of the stock. Nor do they determine capital and operating expenditures
independently; the object instead is to maximize the return on all investment.
A 1992 HUD study evaluated how PHA's would fare if paid essentially a
market rate for providing housing, allowing the PHA's to allocate funds to
operating and modernization needs as warranted. The study found, incredibly,
that if PHA's were paid on a capitated basis in accord with Fair Market Rents
(FMR's), total federal subsidies would be cut by 31%, saving the federal
government $1.4 billion per year.215 An FMR capitated-payment system
would not only save money, it would penalize the worst managed PHA's.
210. See CLPHA, supra note 40, at 8-9; CAPITATED PAYMENT FORMULAS, supra note 36, at 104;
Stegman, supra note 19, at 350.
211. "It has been suggested that some PHA's may actually be able to improve their financial situation
by sealing off an entire building, thereby minimizing the costs of operating it while still collecting partial
operating subsidies." CAP1TATED PAYMENT FORMULAS, supra note 36, at 7.
212. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 14371(e) (West Supp. 1993).
213. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 14371(k)(B)-(C) (West Supp. 1993).
214. Housing and Community Development Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-550, § 111, 106 Stat. 3672
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437c(j)(2)(A), (D) (West Supp. 1993)). Obsolete projects have
vacancy rates in excess of 25%; significantly high redesign, reconstruction, or redevelopment costs; or other
statutorily defined special problems. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437c(j)(2)(B) (West Supp. 1993)).
215. CAPITATED PAYMENT FORMULAS, supra note 36, at 66. "Capitated basis" means that subsidies
are paid on the basis of the number of households occupying units. Fair Market Rents are benchmarks used
to determine federal subsidy payments for HUD-assisted households living in private rental housing.
"FMR's are based on rent levels for decent quality housing units at the forty-fifth percentile of the rent
distribution for recent movers." Id. at 19. On FMR's, see generally 24 C.F.R. § 882.106 (1992).
The capitated payment levels for PHA's analyzed in the study were based on the FMR's for units of
different sizes, adjusted for tenant rent contribution and debt service payments made by the federal
government. A 7% percent administrative fee is tacked on to compensate PHA's for the administrative
burden of income certifications and subsidy calculations. CAPITATED PAYMENT FORMULAS, supra note 36,
at 19-20.
Less radical solutions would also generate savings. If all backlog modernization were funded on the
basis of need, and only operating subsidies and the accrual portion of modernization funding were allocated
on a capitated basis, federal subsidies to extra-large PHA's would decline by 11.6%. Id. at 74.
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Most PHA's that maintained vacancy rates of over 20% would lose over half
of their current funding.216
Transfer to an FMR capitated-payment system would surely result in
reduction of the current public housing stock. Experts consulted by HUD
disfavored a capitated funding system for this reason.217 They predicted that,
with more latitude to allocate resources, PHA's would act with short-term
vision, spending on annual unit inspections and deferred maintenance rather
than making major capital improvements.2"' Vacancies would persist and
units would deteriorate, and PHA's would have to vacate additional units that
become uneconomic to supply. Some experts feared that displaced households
would not succeed in finding private apartments with vouchers. 2 9 Experts
also objected to basing payments on FMR's or private multifamily housing
because PHA's face special costs. These include the costs of buildings that
have not been modernized or energy-improved, or are saddled with design
flaws; the costs of security against crimes, drugs, and vandalism; and special
costs associated with housing large or single-parent families.220
These objections to capitated funding miss the mark. It is precisely because
PHA's have bungled the design, development, and management of buildings,
and concentrated poor families in large projects, which breed crime and
vandalism, that we should forswear this form of housing assistance if cheaper
alternatives exist in the local market. PHA's must be forced to streamline and
reconfigure their stock. The imperative for HUD is to ensure that the shift to
an FMR-based capitated-payment system would not have draconian effects
either on current tenants or on economically viable units.22'
First, HUD should phase the system in gradually to allow PHA's to shed
excess staff or costly units. As part of the transition to a capitated-payment
system, PHA's should model the effects of a capitated-payment system on their
funding levels, and develop operations and modernization spending plans in
anticipation of the new system. PHA's should not have to rely on current funds
for investment; like private developers, they should be allowed to "borrow"
against future payment streams to modernize units where economically justified
(i.e., where the net discounted cost of renovating and operating the unit as
public housing over the relevant time period would be less than that of voucher
216. Id. at 73.
217. HUD consulted 13 experts on PHA management and funding, including PHA directors, HUD
officials, public housing advocates, and PHA management consultants, for their views. Id. at vi.
218. Id. at 106.
219. See Stegman, supra note 19, at 351 (noting discrimination as factor).
220. CAPITATED PAYMENT FORMULAS, supra note 36, at 109.
221. HUD would also have to design a capitated-payment system different from that used in the
study's simulations. Since public housing development costs were far higher than private costs, subtracting
debt service payments from the FMR would leave too little for legitimate operating and modernization
costs. The development costs are already sunk, and the formula should be adjusted to parallel private
market operating and modernization costs. FMR's may also need to be refined to address the apparent
penalizing of PHA's with large or single-parent families. See id. at 91.
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conversion). HUD should review the spending plans and implement controls
to ensure that the cuts were targeted to waste, in terms of both staff and high-
cost units, and not to services to remaining public housing tenants.
Second, HUD must guarantee funding of vouchers to protect tenants who
may be displaced by the elimination of uneconomical stock. HUD should have
special authority to adjust voucher terms and conditions to expedite tenant
conversion in tight markets,z22 and should work with the PHA's to ensure
that tenants secure new housing expeditiously. HUD could make additional
modernization or operations funding for public housing units available on a
showing that voucher conversion is not feasible in a particular market.
B. Liberalizing DemolitionlDisposition Laws
A market-based approach to public housing requires that PHA's treat
properties as assets whose market values should be maximized. Land on which
public housing is built often becomes far more valuable for uses other than
low-income housing.2" Potential expansion of housing assistance has been
blocked by staunch resistance to any diminution of the public housing stock.
The hands of both PHA's and HUD are bound by strict statutory
demolition and disposition provisions. Those provisions focus on preservation
or regeneration of the stock,224 and include strict one-for-one replacement
rules that allow the use of tenant-based assistance only in very limited
circumstances and after extensive fact-finding and consultation.' Current
222. For housing assistance connected with the sale of HUD-owned property, HUD can approve rents
up to 20% above the FMR in special circumstances. 24 C.FR. § 886.310 (1992). HUD should have the
same flexibility to convert tenant subsidies in uneconomic housing projects to vouchers.
223. In New Britain, Connecticut, the sale of three units in a commercial part of town would have
generated funds to purchase ten more units worth $250,000 elsewhere. Public Housing and Section 8
Programs, supra note 57, at 10 (testimony of Rep. Nancy L. Johnson). In Houston, the sale of Allen
Parkway Village, a substandard, downtown 1000-unit complex, was estimated to be able to generate $120
million, or enough to house 2000 households. U.S. GEN. ACCTOUNTING OFFICE, PUBLIC HOUSING:
PROPOSED SALE OF THE ALLEN PARKWAY VILLAGE PROJECT IN HOUSTON, TEXAs 21-22 (1986). The
proposal has been ensnared in litigation for about a decade. See James Robinson, Judge Boosts City Hope
of Razing Housing Project, HOUS. CHRON., Jan. 15, 1993, at Al. Now only 29 of 1000 units are occupied;
all 29 are substandard. Eric Hanson, Housing Project's Occupied Units Called Substandard, Hous. CHRON.,
Dec. 18, 1992, at A40.
224. The provisions bar demolition of a project unless it is "unusable for housing purposes, and no
reasonable program of modifications is feasible to return the project or portion of the project to useful life."
42 U.S.C.A. § 1437p(a)(1) (,Vest Supp. 1993). Transfer is only permitted if in the best interests of tenants
because developmental changes in the area "adversely affect the health or safety of the tenants or the
feasible operation of the project," or "because disposition allows the acquisition, development, or
rehabilitation of other properties which will be more efficiently or effectively operated as low-income
housing projects and which will preserve the total amount of low-income housing stock available in the
community, or because of other factors ... consistent with the best interests of the tenants or the public
housing agency .... " 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437p(a)(2)(A)(i) (West Supp. 1993).
225. Current disposition law only permits tenant-based assistance if HUD finds, on the basis of
objective data, that replacement with project-based assistance is not feasible, and that the market will
support all available certificates and vouchers for 15 years. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437p(b)(3)(C)(i)-(ii) (West
Supp. 1993). Tenant-based assistance must generally be granted for 15 years, and may not be in the form
of a rental voucher. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437p(b)(3)(A)(v) (West Supp. 1993). An exception is made for projects
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law thus operates to exclude the most efficient form of assisting tenants. The
law should be revised to reduce the transactional impediments, as long as
tenant interests are protected by a voucher program. A preferable regime would
limit HUD review of a transaction proposed by a PHA to certification that (1)
the disposition of public housing assets is economically justified (to prevent
self-dealing or gross mistakes), (2) there are guarantees to protect current
tenants, either by transfer to other units or by 5-year vouchers, 26 and (3)
proceeds are efficiently recycled to provide assistance to additional families,
after obligations attached to the assets are retired. As long as current tenants
can be protected, returning assets to private management at fair value leads to
overall economic efficiency: assets are traded to their best commercial use,
thereby generating more funds for housing aid.
C. Direct Privatization of Economically Unviable Projects of Troubled
Housing Authorities to the Highest Bidder
Simulated market incentives and liberalized disposition laws do not fully
substitute for the profit motive, and will not turn PHA's into profit-
maximizers. Moreover, they will do nothing to solve the urgent problems
brewing at the most obdurate "troubled" PHA's-problems which demand
swift action by HUD. The agency has substantial authority to take control of
those PHA's, or even poorly managed projects, and transfer operating control
to private interests.227 But conversion to private management is by no means
a panacea. Because of the difficulty of structuring long-term incentives in a
contract, hiring private management companies is a second-best solution.228
HUD must adopt strategies to have title transferred from PHA's into private
hands. As discussed above, these may entail converting the asset to nonhousing
of more than 200 units; replacements for up to 50% of units may be in the form of 5-year tenant-based
assistance, where such assistance is necessary. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437p(b)(3)(B)(ii) (West Supp. 1993).
226. Congress rarely approves 15-year certificates because the whole 15 years must be authorized in
the current-year budget. Interview with John Valencia, Staff Director, House Subcommittee on Housing and
Community Development, in Washington, D.C. (Mar. 16, 1993). Congress could facilitate PHA asset
management by making more five-year certificates available and by eliminating the restrictive conditions
discussed above. Such unencumbered certificates were approved for HOPE-I replacements. 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 1437aaa-3(g) (,Vest Supp. 1993). Many public housing advocates contend that such short-term
commitments put low-income housing at risk. One of the heralded virtues of public housing is its
permanence. See HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT ACT OF 1987, H.R. REP. No. 100-122(1),
100th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1987), reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3317, 3332; Stegman, supra note 19,
at 340. As I have discussed, that permanence comes at the expense of excluding deserving families.
227. 24 C.ER. § 901.200 (1992). HUD may intervene upon "substantial default" by a PHA, which
is not limited to breaches of or defaults on the Annual Contributions Contract between HUD and the PHA.
24 C.ER. § 901.205 (1992).
228. The success of private management depends wholly on the incentives structured in the contract.
Some private contractors have not even managed to outperform PHA's in the management of public
housing. U.S. DEP'T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEv., PUBLIC HOUSING AUTHORITY EXPERIENCE WITH PRIVATE
MANAGEMENT: A COMPARATIVE STUDY x-xi (1983) (finding higher rent delinquency and crime/vandalism
rates and no cost savings at privately managed sites).
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uses and recycling the funds raised to create vouchers for existing tenants and
currently unserved families. However, where the asset's best use is as a rental
property, or where market conditions are unfavorable for vouchers, the strategy
should be to sell the asset to a private landlord, whether for-profit or non-
profit.229 Landlords with alienable property rights will be more likely than
PHAs to make economically rational decisions about modernization, closure,
and maintenance, which in the long-term will protect the overall stock.
HUD does not have statutory authority to take clear title to public housing
properties, even in the face of gross mismanagement. 2 0 Two options present
themselves. First, troubled PHA's must by law negotiate with HUD a
Memorandum of Agreement detailing mandatory performance
improvements.231 Using operating and modernization funds as leverage, HUD
could demand as a condition of the agreement that PHA's privatize their most
costly properties. Second, HUD could seek a grant of new statutory authority
to mandate sales of public housing to implement this privatization strategy,
similar to that passed as part of the HOPE-1 program. 32 HUD could solicit
bids from private landlords233 and mandate sales to approved bidders unless
PHA's, acting under liberalized disposition laws, could fetch a better price for
the assets on the open market.z 4 Many public housing projects would
undoubtedly be unable to attract a private landlord. Where projects are so
disadvantaged, and private market alternatives exist to protect current tenants,
projects should be eliminated.
This third strategy will only work if, in its initial stages, it is tightly
focused on the most troubled PHA's. HUD faces a herculean task in selling
foreclosed properties from other failed low-income housing programs. 5 It
would be fatuous to suggest that HUD preside over a massive fire sale of
public housing properties at the same time. The key is to minimize HUD's role
229. Cf. David Gonzalez, Defending the Nonprofit Motive; Tenants Decry Sale of Troubled Buildings
to Private Owners, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 1993, at BI.
230. HUD may take title to projects upon substantial default on the Annual Contributions Contract,
but must "redeliver possession of the project as constituted at the time of reconveyance or redelivery" once
the default is cured or the contract terminates. 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(g)(2) (1988).
231. 24 C.F.R. § 901.140 (1992).
232. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437aaa-4(a) (Supp. III 1991).
233. Cf. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 154, at 2-3, 31 (describing transfer by HUD of
failed low-income cooperative to private landlord).
234. The open-market option would alleviate any takings concern under the Fifth Amendment, since
PHA's would be able to secure "just compensation" for their assets. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; Schill,
supra note 13, at 928-35.
235. HUD now owns 170 foreclosed buildings, comprising 29,000 units, which it is anxious to sell.
Stephen Engelberg, HUD's Chief Seeks Wide New Powers, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 1993, at A13. Given a
high rate of projected foreclosures, HUD estimates the cost of the bailout at $11.9 billion. Yet Another
HUD Bailout, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, June 25, 1993, at 4B. HUD does not now have sufficient resources
or statutory flexibility-e.g., the freedom to use 5-year instead of 15-year vouchers-to manage the
disposition of those properties. Cisneros has petitioned Congress for relief. See Hearing on Housing
Programs, Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, FED. NEWS SERV., July 28, 1993,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File, at *34.
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in the management?6 and disposition of the properties. The strategy outlined
above relies on oversight, bargaining, and statutory mandates. If pursued in
conjunction with a switch to market-based subsidies, this strategy can force
PHA's to make the necessary economic choices to privatize public housing.
V. CONCLUSIONS
A crisis of high vacancy rates and gravely underfunded modernization
needs looms in public housing today, particularly in the largest and most
troubled PHA's. This crisis results from ill-starred policies, corruption,
mismanagement, and the inherent inefficacy of government supply-side
intervention in the housing market. Jack Kemp's inefficient solution of selling
public housing to the residents, at least in the multifamily context, does not
warrant the allocation of the resources it would require. The solution lies in
opening low-income housing to market forces through efficiency-driven
privatization. The government should undertake to convert tenant subsidies of
public housing to vouchers. First, HUD should phase in a market-based, and
not stock-driven, subsidy system for all public housing. Second, HUD should
initiate a program of regulatory reform that would free PHA's to maximize the
economic value of current public housing assets by sale to the highest bidder.
Current tenants would be made whole by converting their subsidies to
vouchers, and the net savings would be dedicated to expanding housing
assistance. Third, HUD should aggressively intervene to have "troubled"
housing authorities privatize their most costly properties.
In its National Performance Review on streamlining government, the
Clinton Administration has embraced privatization as a solution to some
bureaucratic ills. 37 HUD Secretary Henry Cisneros has signaled a
willingness to be bold in housing policy."8 The boldest stroke he can make
is to recast privatization of public housing as a nonpartisan initiative to
improve and expand assistance to families in need.
236. HUD's most iecent attempt, in Philadelphia, to manage public housing properties has been a
debacle. See Michael deCourcy Hinds, Housing Agency's Problems Deepen as U.S. Rescue Effort Proves
Futile, N.Y. TIMEs, June 9, 1993, at A14.
237. See Helen Thomas, Clinton-Gore Offer Plan To Streamline Bureaucracy, UPI, Sept. 7, 1993,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
238. See Gugliotta, supra note 185.
1994]

